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Abstract

Title: Social Media Fetishism: The Substitution of Life, The Disavowal of Death, and
The Zombie Syndrome
Statement: I am studying social media as a symptom within a culture of fetishism, where
social media has become a substitute for human interaction under the concepts of
fetishism outlined by Marx, Freud, Kaplan, Debord, and Baudrillard because I want to
find out why people have fetishized social media so that one can understand how to
rectify the underlying issues causing the fetish.
In the past decade, social media has become fetishized by a select group of users,
characterized by hours a day spent on these websites, and failed attempts to delete their
accounts permanently. I analyze both fetishism and social media in order to understand
the implications of social media fetishism. I start with fetishism. I open up the discussion
of fetishism by tracing the concept’s evolution from its origins in native cultures as a
worship of talismans and other charms in substitution for a physical presence of their
Gods. From there I analyze fetishism through the lens of Marxist commodity fetishism
both to apply the concept of commodity fetishism to the current social media culture, and
also to further illuminate the substitutive nature of fetishism through highlighting
commodity fetishism’s substitution of human sentiment by a material object or objects. I
continue to analyze the substitutive nature of fetishism through Freud’s sexual fetishism,
in which objects or body parts are used as substitutes for sexual arousal as well as for
intimacy. After establishing a basis for fetishism in these three historical contexts, I recontextualize fetishism from the modern perspective of Louise Kaplan, author of
Cultures of Fetishism. Then, in order to establish the link between fetishism and social
media, I analyze Facebook and Twitter as fetishized spectacles, through the lens of
Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle.” This connection also builds upon Baudrillard’s
theories on simulation, analyzing social media as a simulated reality. After firmly
establishing this line of reasoning, I seek to prove that the avoidance of human interaction
or desire for mediated interaction, as well as the creation of a social media identity, is a
direct response to anxiety characterized by the fear of death. I posit that since one cannot
maintain stable identities in the real world due to criticism as well as the potential for
physical death, one seek to create more stable, lasting, enduring, and potentially
indestructible personalities on social media sites that by characteristic of being on the
Internet, have the potential to exist outside the boundaries of human existence and the
human lifespan.
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Introduction
In the past decade, social media in mainstream society has been steadily
increasing. The most obvious examples of which are Facebook and Twitter, but in
addition to these two are a whole cornucopia of other social media forms. Many people
accept these forms of social media into their lives. Some people see social media as a fad,
others as a hobby, and others are indifferent. However social media should be seen as a
symptom. While social media may seem harmless, it is actually a cultural fetish. While
this is not necessarily true for all social media users, it is true among a fetishistic culture
of users. A criticism of this thesis might be that the conclusions are not universally
applicable. However, this thesis is only referring to those individual users of social media
who use it in a manner that could be considered fetishism defined by absence,
substitution, and fixation. Some people may use social media once or twice a week, and
have no real attachment to their profiles or social media identities. These are not the
people addressed in this thesis. Again, this thesis is only addressing those individuals that
participate within the culture of social media fetishism.
Historically, fetishism is not foreign to international culture. According to
William Pietz’s research, the concept of the fetish most likely originated from the native
tribal traditions of the inhabitants of the Guinea cost of Africa, who worshipped charms
and talismans as a substitute for not having a physical manifestation of their Gods. The
word fetish comes from the Portuguese “fatisso” meaning charm or sorcery, which later
evolved through the French Fétich after popularization in 1760 by anthropologist C. de
Brosses’ “Le Culte des Dieux Fétiches.” Around 1867, the term was adopted into
American English as fetish, meaning “something irrationally revered”.
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One famous theorist who studied fetishism was Karl Marx. Marx specifically
studied commodity fetishism, which is the substitution of human sentiment by a material
object produced through labor. Already, one can see the beginnings of a pattern. In both
of these cases, fetishism involves the substitution of one notion or idea for a more easily
attainable perverted re-creation of the original idea. In the case of commodity fetishism,
the original idea would be that of human interaction and labor through trade that has been
reduced to an acquisition of an object that represents the interaction in labor, but
eliminates the human component.
In Freudian sexual fetishism, a person substitutes the original idea of sexual
intercourse for a representation of that idea or of that arousal such as an object or body
part. As one begins to see more of the pattern of fetishism, one can come to more
conclusions. At first one was able to establish that fetishism involves substitution. But
now with a third form of fetishism to analyze, it becomes apparent that not only is
substitution an aspect of fetishism that remains constant as others differ, but so is the loss
or absence of intimacy.
In the case of the natives, they did not have the intimate connection with their
Gods that they sought, and so they created a substitute. In commodity fetishism, there is
an absence or loss of the intimacy that is experienced in the interactions between people,
which has been hyper-accelerated in the digital age. One now has the ability to click once
on Amazon and have a package waiting for one at one’s doorstep, all without any type of
human interaction or intimacy. In sexual fetishism, a person directly avoids the intimate
contact with another person and creates a substitute in the form of a body part or object
so that one can experience the benefits of sexual arousal without the risk of intimacy.
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This thesis challenges, analyzes, and explores the risk of intimacy as it relates to
fetishism. To understand fetishism, one must first understand why one are creating
substitutes for intimacy. One create substitutes for intimacy because one see intimacy as a
time of vulnerability. But vulnerable to what? When one becomes intimate, one
immediately becomes subject to two vulnerabilities. One becomes vulnerable to physical
destruction as well as psychological destruction. When one is intimate, potentially naked,
one lets his/her guard down in relaxation while allowing the other person to view his/her
self as he/she is without any type of mediation. Physically, one is vulnerable to
destruction without clothes and without any type of weapons, shields, or form of
protection agaisnt harm. Psychologically, when one becomes intimate, one does the
same. One trusts another person with the fullest versions of oneself. Normally one adapts
oneself to one’s surroundings. To a certain extent, one acts to meet social expectations.
But when true intimacy is reached, one does not feel the need to conform. One does not
change oneself. One is oneself in one’s entirety. And thus one is vulnerable to
psychological destruction. If one presents one’s unmediated self to people, one’s identity,
one subject one’s unprotected personality to criticism, which if one is not psychologically
strong enough to weather, can destroy one’s self-concept and self-esteem.
The root of these fears, as well as the root of all fears, is the fear of death. What
would one fear if one were immortal? Would one fear finding a job? Of course not; one
only worries about work because one needs a job to feed oneself. Would one fear heights
or roller coasters or murderers or theft? One would have no reason to have any of these
fears as they all relate to the eventuality of possible death. Now if people’s physical
bodies were invincible, what might one still be afraid of? Even with infinite life, a man
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might still be scared to approach a woman he finds attractive, especially if he is insecure.
If he believes that he is ugly, and knowing that he is immortal believes that he will be
ugly for eternity, then he will likely experience a profound sense of fear when
approaching an attractive woman. So in this case, although he is not fearing a physical
death, he is fearing a psychological death. He fears the death of his self-pride. He fears
embarrassment. The only logical reason for fearing this type of embarrassment is that a
person actually fears the death of his/her psychological self, self-image, or self-concept as
much as he/she fears physical or bodily death.
Professor Louise Kaplan, author of Cultures of Fetishism adds great insight on
this topic. Kaplan re-contextualizes Freud to explain the concept of disavowal. In
Freudian Psychology, disavowal stems from the male’s fear of the female’s lack of the
phallus. Freud believes that men become so terrified by the image of what they
subconsciously view as castration, that at some level of the subconscious they actually
disavow that the woman does not have a phallus. Kaplan goes on to explain that while
this type of disavowal is integral to fetishism, the disavowal is not of the woman’s absent
phallus as is historically suggested. Rather, the disavowal is often of the concept of death
or loss as its own entity, despite its various forms. She posits that when a person engages
in fetishism, he seeks to compensate for or substitute for that which is lacking. In the case
of the native peoples, the talismans and charms were a disavowal of the notion that God
could not be experienced directly and physically. In the case of commodity fetishism, the
commodities or products of labor are disavowals of the presence and humanity of the
laborers. A person can fetishize a Coach pocket book while at the same time disavowing
the notion of the underpaid and frequently outsourced minimum wage or fewer workers
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who struggle to make a living while the company turns million dollar profits. At the same
time, the person disavows a piece of her own humanity as she turns her back on her
contemporaries and at the same time identifies with the materials she purchases as
opposed to her own bodily self.
This disavowal functions in social media. In a social media fetish, a person
disavows all aspects of his character or personality that he does not accept. At the same
time, he is disavowing both psychological and physical death. People are substituting
insecure identities in the real world for secure identities in social media worlds. If people
talk face to face, they can be insulted and criticized. If the person is weak minded or
insecure, his reputation as well as his self-image or self-concept is in jeopardy, is
unprotected, and is thus vulnerable to death. In the real world, other people can see their
emotions. Other people can see what they don’t want to be seen.
This is not the case with social media. In the case of social media, the user is
entirely in control of creating his profile or avatar. On popular sites such as Facebook, the
user creates an entire identity by linking events and pictures through a timeline. A person
creates a digital representation of himself. Since this digital representation can only be
altered by the user, so long as his password is secure, it is a safe identity. It is protected
from criticism. If a person does criticize him and threatens his identity, he can block him
with the click of a button. If a person is tagged in a picture he does not like, he can untag
himself, disavowing that this captured side of him was even him at all. He eliminates the
image from the timeline, and thus from his identity, and thus from the digital self-concept
or self-image that he is projecting into the world. At the same time, by creating and
managing an online profile, the person is creating and managing an identity that is
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outside of death. Or perhaps that is conceivably outside of death. People die and their
Facebook pages remain. Their identities remain. Even after physical death, they have
somewhat managed to preserve their identities. Is this not the attraction to fame? It is
almost intuitive that people seek fame in order to extend their presence, image, and
person, past the physical limits of humanity.
In the real world, the user or person does not have this type of control. For one, in
the non-virtual world, a person more or less dies when his body is laid to rest, or in other
words loses the ability to maintain animate function. Second, in reality, if a person is
attempting to deny his own uncomfortable life situation such as that he is obese and
living in his mother’s basement while believing the reality that he is a level 40 Paladin,
the real world, and human interaction, pose a serious threat to his entire identity. For this
person, not only is he escaping physical death in his Paladin realm, he is also escaping the
psychological death of his social media identity, or identity within a social media
supportive massive multiplayer online video game. If this person were to interact largely
in the real world, he would have to accept the death of his psychological self-image, selfconcept, or self-identification as a level 40 Paladin.
Through this line of logic, as well as continuing to analyze and explore this topic
through the lenses of other theorists on fetishism and substitution such as Guy Debord
and Jean Baudrillard, it will become clear that social media fetishism is a reaction to the
fear of death, either of the physical self or of the psychological self.
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Chapter I
Before one can contextualize fetishism in a modern sense, one must first
understand its history. Over the past few centuries, the word fetish has been attributed
with various different meanings. However, although the term fetish takes on different
meanings in different contexts, there are central principles that link each of these
definitions. In each instance the word fetish is used throughout history, an object is seen
as a material representation of an individual’s irrational or indirect conception of value.
In some contexts, the individual’s attribution of value is supported by a societal system of
economics that reinforces this type of thinking, as is the case in Marx’s notion of the
fetish. In other contexts, the individual’s attribution of value is related to that individual’s
personal experience, regardless of the surrounding society, as in Freud’s notion of the
fetish.
It is my view that both of these perspectives are accurate, and are complementary,
not mutually exclusive analyses of the fetish. In order to understand the fetish in a
modern sense, one must not only trace its history, but also find the connection between its
disparate parts. One must take into account both the individual and societal components
of the fetish. Understanding the history of the fetish is important because through each
contextualization of the word fetish, one experiences not a distortion, but an
augmentation. And though many of the differences between conceptualizations must be
discarded to come to a definition, it is finding the similarities in the word fetish through
so many different lenses and perspectives that is crucial to establishing its definition at
present. Throughout its history, three characteristics of fetishism are absence, material
substitution, and uncontrollable fixation.
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Although anthropologist William Pietz admits that, “origins are never absolute,”
his research proposes that:
The fetish as an idea and a problem, and as a novel object not proper to
any prior discrete society, originated in the cross-cultural spaces of the
coast of West Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries […]
the fetish originated within a novel social formation during this period
through the development of the pidgin word Fetisso, this word in turn has
a linguistic and accompanying conceptual lineage that may be traced.
Fetisso derives from the Portuguese word feticio, which in the late Middle
Ages, meant “magical practice” or “witchcraft” performed, often
innocently, by the simple, ignorant, classes. Feticio in turn derives from
the Latin adjective facticlus, which originally meant, “manufactured.” The
historical study of the fetish must begin by considering these words in
some detail, only then going on to examine the subsequent development
into Fetisso, and finally that word’s textual dissemination into the
languages of northern Europe, where national versions of the word
developed during the seventeenth century. (Pietz 1)
For Pietz the etymology of the word fetish is as important as its various definitions.
Though this essay focuses more on the definitions of fetish established from the
seventeenth century onward, Pietz is correct in his assertion that it is worth considering in
some detail, the words preceding fetish. By Pietz’s research, the first word in the lineage
is the Latin adjective faticulus, meaning manufactured. This word then evolved into the
Portuguese word feticio, meaning magical practice or witchcraft.
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Before the word fetish had even fully coalesced into the term one recognize today,
it had already embodied two concepts. The first concept is that of being manufactured.
This represents the material or physical object. The second concept is the notion of magic
or witchcraft. These terms represent a spiritual or non-physical dimension of that which is
the object of the fetish. At the time of their use these two terms may have been used
separately from one another. However once the word had transcended faticulus and
feticio to become fetisso and ultimately fetish, their meanings had combined forming the
conceptual foundations of the modern fetish.
The first time the word fetish was used was with African tribes. Though it is
uncertain exactly who was first to apply the term to African spirituality, its meaning in
that context is documented. Tribal Africans would often carry talismans, charms, or other
trinkets that they assigned great value to. Talismans could be said to imbue a person with
strength, wisdom, prosperity, or possibly even affect that which is outside of the person
such as the weather and the afterlife (Pietz 4-6).
Absence is the first key component of defining fetishism. What is lost in this
assignment of value is a correlation to the physical. Surely one can agree that holding a
carved piece of wood is not what causes rain. And yet without the science one use today
to explain what was then phenomenon, the tribal Africans would believe that holding a
“special” piece of carved wood, rock, or jewel were correlated to this phenomenon. Or at
least so believed the Portuguese traders who called African spiritual objects fetishes. This
belief marks an absence. Whether it is an absence of information, explanation, or
understanding. There is an absence of the psychological representation for the actual
cause of rain. Since these people did not have the technology to create a correlation
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between rain, pressure systems, humidity, warm fronts and cold fronts, etc, they sought
out a physical correlation as an explanation.
Substitution is the second key component of defining fetishism. The use of an
object to create a physical representation of an idea is a substitution for that lack of
understanding. The object does not actually have any power of its own. The greatest
extent of the power the object has in reality is in so far as it can be used. However in
these cases, objects could be granted even the power to create rain. They are substituting
a talisman, charm, or trinket to account for an absence of information, understanding, or
explanation. So the Portuguese claimed that the tribal Africans would take the idea of
raining, and they would connect that idea to a physical object. To choose which object, a
popular theory in these types of tribal African religions is the first encounter theory. This
is the notion that Africans would take whatever they first encountered after an event to be
some sort of sign or symbol from the divine. Although many times the first encounter
was an object, the power was also extended to plants and animals. So if it rained heavily
for three days and then a farmer found a piece of driftwood washed up ashore, that piece
of wood might be seen as the cause of the rain. Or it might even be carved into the shape
of a raindrop and then used as a talisman to bring rain.
Fixation is the third key component of defining fetishism. In the case of the
tribesmen, their talismans were used as objects of worship. They would use the same
object time and time again in hopes at producing the same effects. It could even be called
an obsession with these objects. Although the actual focus of these tribesmen’s
motivations were in a more direct relation to the actual rain and the crops which it helped
them to raise, the fixation would not be so much on the events, but rather displaced to the
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object. This fixation and obsession is not only the assignment of value, but it is also the
displacement of value. It is my assertion that the root of all this displacement of value is
the value of life. This is a displacement of the value that a person has for oneself.
In the example of the rain talisman, it is the rain that is valued. The rain is valued
because it helps to produce crops. Crops are valued because they help to keep people
alive. In the examples where talismans bring strength, wisdom, or another personal
quality, all of these are enhancers to life. And all of these qualities are qualities that can
be expressed by that person’s life force. For example, a talisman only aids in making a
person strong in so far as that he believes it will and then allows himself to become
strong. But it is not the talisman doing the work; it is merely the talisman that persuades
the person to invest in his own expression of strength. In each example, the value that is
displaced is the value of life, or of the value of the original person. If this example seems
vague, perhaps it will become clearer through the view of commodity fetishism.
Although commodity fetishism is quite different from the fetishism of the African
tribesmen, it still contains the three basic principles of absence, substitution, and fixation.
Commodity fetishism is a term invented by Karl Marx. He uses the term to describe the
products of labor that are traded within a capitalistic system. Marx understands that
objects have use value. When he talks about commodity fetishism and the
misappropriation of value, this is not what he is referring to. He acknowledges use value:
The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of
air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no
existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as iron, corn, or
a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value,
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something useful. This property of a commodity is independent of the
amount of labour required to appropriate its useful qualities. When
treating of use value, one always assume to be dealing with definite
quantities, such as dozens of watches, yards of linen, or tons of iron. The
use values of commodities furnish the material for a special study, that of
the commercial knowledge of commodities. Use values become a reality
only by use or consumption: they also constitute the substance of all
wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth. In the form of
society one is about to consider, they are, in addition, the material
depositories of exchange value. (Marx 2)
When Marx is referring to commodity fetishism, he is talking about when the value of a
commodity transcends its use value. In the examples Marx mentions, every product has a
use that can be compared to the uses of other products. But when the commodity
becomes what Marx refers to as a “mysterious thing” is when the value of human labor
becomes lost within a commodity. Marx uses the example of table. As he sees it, the
product of a table has the power to take on a power even greater than that of the value of
labor it took to produce it. Marx is somewhat baffled by this phenomena. It is so difficult
for him to compare to his own realm of experience that he says, “to find an analogy, one
must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the
productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and
entering into relation both with one another and the human race (2).”
For Marx, a commodity becomes fetishized when it takes on a trade value. When
the commodity is being traded, it takes on a value that transcends the value of the labor.
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In a sense the value of the labor is lost. Marx says that in order to trade items for other
items, then one must be equalizing the general and abstract quality of human labor into
the object or commodity that is produced. To Marx, the fetishized commodity is a
necessary result of producing within a system that trades products for other products:
The equalisation of the most different kinds of labour can be the result
only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their
common denominator, viz. expenditure of human labour power or human
labour in the abstract. The twofold social character of the labour of the
individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those
forms which are impressed upon that labour in every-day practice by the
exchange of products. In this way, the character that his own labour
possesses of being socially useful takes the form of the condition, that the
product must be not only useful, but useful for others, and the social
character that his particular labour has of being the equal of all other
particular kinds of labour, takes the form that all the physically different
articles that are the products of labour have one common quality, viz., that
of having value. (Marx “The Fetishism Of Commodities And The Secret
Thereof”)
For example, a modern version of this principle might be a Coach pocketbook.
Regardless of the hours that it requires to make, despite its use value or the cost of
materials, a Coach pocketbook can sell for hundreds to thousands of dollars. The labor is
not worth thousands of dollars. The materials are not worth thousands of dollars. As soon
as the Coach pocketbook becomes not just a pocketbook that is for use by the person who
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produced it and instead becomes a commodity to be traded, it has transcended its use
value. It takes on an immense, almost magical value.
In this case, when the product takes on this almost magical value it is an
immediate substitution for an absence. The absence is the absence of the accurate
representation of human labor. The labor is no longer associated with the pocket book.
The pocket book becomes an entity unto itself to interact with people and products, to be
both used and exchanged. The product itself is a substitution for the value of labor. It
both substitutes for and replaces the conceptualization of labor. And once the product
takes on this commodity form, it becomes fixated upon. It becomes an object to be almost
worshipped. Especially such is the case with a Coach pocket book. A person will display
such an item and even use that item as a symbol of value for the person. The bag signifies
the status of a person with enough money to purchase such an item. Thus when the
person displays this item, his/her own perceived worth increases.
When one look at the situation in this way, when one think of the ways in which
people use objects as a means of identifying their own value of worth through the
displacement of the value of other’s labor, one can return back to the notion of life. A
person’s labor is merely an expression of that person’s life force. It is an expression of
that person’s efforts and energy. However a commodity is more than that. In a
commodity, a person places the value not only of the person’s labor that has gone into it,
and not only of the value of its use, but also the value of the person himself. The person
associates with his commodities and ranks his own value with the value of his
commodities. He decides how much he is worth, and how much his own life is worth, by
estimating the perceived worth of the commodities which he possesses.
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Paralleling Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism in both renown and eloquence
is Freud’s theory of sexual fetishism. While many of Freud’s points are dated and
disproved, his ideas are worth examination for the sake of its historical context and to aid
in the process of re-contextualization. Following the pattern of the previous two forms of
fetishism, Freudian fetishism is also characterized first by an absence. Traditionally, in
Freudian sexual Fetishism, the absence is that of the mother’s penis. According to
Freud’s theory, at the root of all fetishes, there is the male fear of castration. When a boy
realizes that his mother does not have a penis, whether consciously or unconsciously, he
fears that her penis has been castrated. He does not want to lose his penis because he was
born with one. He has become attached to it. He recognizes that it is a part of his body.
For a little boy, this is a fear too overwhelming to manage. He cannot come to
terms with the notion that he might lose penis. In an able to pacify these fears, the
unconscious mind engages in an action know as disavowal. In an essay titled, “Freud; or,
The Absent Object” Giorgio Agamben explains the paradoxical reality of disavowal:
In the conflict between the perception of reality, which urges him to
renounce his phantasm, and the counterdesire, which urges him to deny
his perception, the child does neither one nor the other; or, rather, he does
both simultaneously, reaching one of those compromises that are possible
only under the rule of law of the unconscious. On the one hand, with the
help of a particular mechanism, he disavows the evidence of his
perception; on the other, he recognizes its reality, and through a perverse
symptom, he assumes the anguish he feels before it. (Agamben 31)
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Under this definition, “the fetish is therefore the “substitute for the woman’s (the
mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in and – for reasons familiar to us – does
not want to give up” (152-53) (Agamben 31.)
On this point I must disagree with Freud. It has been said that Freud’s perception
is sometimes skewed due to his focus on sexuality. This is true here as well. It is not
necessarily true that the concept of disavowal is a direct result of the reaction to the
mother’s absent penis, nor is it true that the fetish is the substitute for the mother’s penis.
While the concept of disavowal is indeed in play, Freud misrepresents it in his sexualized
application. Disavowal is a much more deeply rooted issue than the fear of castration.
Freud says that for “reasons familiar to us” the boy does not want to give up his penis.
This is a vague assumption on Freud’s part, as well as it is a shallow one. Freud assumes
that because he has a penis and wants to keep it, that this fear is thus understandable and
able to be generalized. Although it may seem obvious to Freud why he does not want to
lose his penis, that there are actually deeper reasons.
This fear, as well as all fear, is a reaction to the fear of death, be it a physical
death or a psychological one. One example is of Freud’s fear of losing his penis. On a
physical level, the penis is the reproductive organ. If Freud loses his penis, he loses the
ability to continue his genetic life. Without a penis, he cannot create a child and cannot
pass on his genes. Thus there is a death to his lineage. Though the lineage could
potentially continue through a brother or sister, the exact combination of Freud’s DNA
would be lost. It would be dead. From an evolutionary perspective, our most basic
instinct, our most basic programming, is to survive and reproduce. Along this line of
logic, Freud believes that sexuality is present even at the adolescent phases of

Lepkowsky 21
development, though people are aware unconsciously, not consciously. By Freud’s own
logic, if a person has an unconscious awareness of sexuality, then although a little boy
may consciously perceive, “I don’t want to lose my penis,” he may unconsciously
perceive, “I don’t want to lose my ability to reproduce.” The child fears the loss of his
penis because unconsciously, he fears his physical genetic death.
There is also a psychological component to the fear of death. At a conscious level,
the boy is able to realize that the penis is a part of his body. He identifies it with himself.
From a young age, people identify themselves with their bodies. A little boy might be as
scared to lose his arm or his leg, as he was to lose his penis. The child’s fear is not merely
due to a fear of castration, but of the destruction of the self, a concept which is infinitely
more terrifying, especially for a child. Children are still making the connection between
mind and body. They must learn how to crawl, then walk, then run. They are still in the
stage of learning and developing their motor skills. They are creating the mind-body
associations that one take for granted throughout the rest of our lives. But at this stage in
life, making those mind-body connections is of the utmost importance. At the stage one is
still learning to use one’s body, one must also be learning to identify them. One is
becoming aware of oneself, or self-aware. A child would see the loss of a limb or
reproductive organ as not only a loss of part, but also as a destruction of the whole.
Whether a child is male or female, most children are at some point exposed to death and
loss. These concepts and the fear of them are relatively inescapable.
This fear affects people not only in childhood, but also throughout the rest of their
lives. One retains the fear of destruction of the self, whether it is psychological or
physical. As one becomes older, one begins to associate oneself not only with one’s body
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but also one’s possessions and position. A common fear among adults is that of job loss.
Again, there is a physical level of this fear. People fear that if they cannot maintain their
jobs, they will not be able to support themselves, and thus will die. And again, there is a
psychological component to this fear. At a psychological level, people aren’t just afraid
of losing the ability to make money, they are afraid of the death of the identity they have
created. There is a social aspect where a person becomes “unemployed.” The word has a
stigma. All of a sudden, a respectable workingman must now tell people that he is
unemployed. Before he was a man to be admired. Now he is a man to be pitied or to give
compassion to. The identity he created for himself as the successful workingman dies
with the loss of his job. It is the same fear of destruction of the psychological image of
the self of castration. These loses represent a type of psychological castration of a
person’s identity. Unconsciously, one links this absence to death.
On an unconscious level, one see absence as a notion and one relate that notion to
the absence of the self. This is the absence that one truly fears. One fears the absence of
one’s own presence. A destruction of even part of our presence or our identity sparks the
fear of destruction of the self, which has become expanded to be defined as a person as
well as that persons possessions and position. That is not to say that once a person loses
possession or position that he is actually destroyed. In fact, certain individuals experience
loss or crisis and after a period of deep self-evaluation, emerge with a stronger concept of
self that is no longer dependant on that which has been lost. Though it should be
acknowledged that some people also become depressed after loss, and some never fully
recover or regain composure. Though they are not actually dead, they have accepted a
psychological destruction. This situation is where the fear stems from. People fear they
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will suffer an irreparable psychological destruction. Contrary to Freud’s beliefs, it is this
fear, the fear of absence of self, or the fear of death that instigates the disavowal
response. People are disavowing both psychological and physical death, as well as the
actions that remind them of death, such as castration. The fear of death is the root fear in
the fear brought about by the notion of castration. The idea that the fear of death is the
root fear is also more logical than Freud’s view of the fetish in that his view is sexually
biased against women. Women do not have the same fear of castration that men have,
and yet women also have fetishes. Including women in the perspective of the fetish, it
makes more sense that both men and women are reacting to the fear of something that
reminds them of death, and then disavowing that.
So then, if the absence aspect of the fetish is not the absence of the mother’s
penis, then there must be another absence to account for. This absence is the absence of
intimacy. If disavowal is a reaction to fear, then sex must produce a fear. The fear one
reacts to in sex is the fear of intimacy, which ultimately triggers the fear of death. When a
person is intimate with another person, both individuals are in a vulnerable position.
Firstly, if the individuals are engaging in intercourse, there is a high probability that they
are naked. To be naked is to remove a barrier of comfort. The majority of one’s time is
typically spent clothed, and the time one spends interacting is almost always clothed.
Clothes act as a boundary. In a physical sense, clothes give a person more protection
from outside elements. In a psychological sense, clothes provide people with a layer of
identity. People can draw others attentions to approvable topics, such as music, a style, or
a certain designer. Clothes can draw attention away from the body so that the body
cannot be criticized as easily. Clothes can serve as a buffer or distraction. To remove this
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layer, is to put oneself in a more vulnerable position. In the fear of physical death, being
naked or unclothed puts one at a disadvantage against attack. Unconsciously, one fear
confrontation in a vulnerable position, should it lead to death. In the fear of the
psychological death, there are multiple aspects of fear. A person may fear performance
anxiety. She may fear that she may not reach climax or that she will not be able to bring
her partner to climax. She may fear criticism from her partner about her body, or about
her performance, even if climax is reached. In this regard, the fear relates to death in that
if she conceives of herself as successful, this sexual failure could result in the destruction
of herself as a successful person. She will lose her own approval. Her perceived sexual
flaw will distort the quality of the whole.
In contradiction to Freud’s belief that the absence of the fetish is the absence of
the mother’s penis, my assertion is that the absence of the fetish is the absence of
intimacy. By replacing the intimate person with an object, the fear of judgment is
removed. The fear of attack from the other person is removed as well. Again, by a power
granted only to the unconscious mind, a person is able to paradoxically disavow death
through the disavowal of intimacy, while still convincing herself that the object he
replaces the person with is an intimate object. She uses the same object to arouse
intimacy as she does to disavow it. Normally, the person with which another person
becomes intimate is the sexual object. For Freud, the sexual object is “the person from
whom the sexual attraction emanates,” (Freud 4). The sexual object is usually the object
of the sexual aim, which Freud defines as, “the action towards which the impulse
strives,” or the action of sex (Freud 4). In cases of fetishism the person with the fetish
does not need an actual person. They accept and rather prefer the absence of the person.
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And as with the previous examples of fetishism, once there is the absence of intimacy,
there is also a substitution with an object.
In cases of fetishism, the person is replaced with an objectified representation.
The sexual object is typically, “a part of the body but little adapted for sexual purposes,
such as the foot, or hair, or an inanimate object which is in demonstrable relation with the
sexual person, and mostly with the sexuality of the same (fragments of clothing, white
underwear)” (Freud 53). Recently shoes, latex materials, and certain sexual toys have
also constituted fetish objects. As Marx had no other words to describe fetishism other
than to hail back to the religions from which it originated, Freud does the same saying,
“This substitution is not unjustly compared with the fetich in which the savage sees the
embodiment of his god,” (Freud 53). Though both of these prominent thinkers use the
term fetish in completely different settings and contexts, both of them hearken back to the
origins of the word. If not by the similarities throughout the different perspectives, the
connection between these different types of fetishism is clear in the conscious perspective
of these writers who respectively connect each of these philosophies to the same central
notions.
In this instance of the fetish, the substitution is typically not only a substitution for
the sexual object, but also often for a traumatic or particularly excitatory event in a
person’s early life:
The persistent influence of a sexual impress mostly received in early
childhood often shows itself in the selection of a fetich, as Binet first asserted, and
as was later proven by many illustrations,—a thing which may be placed parallel
to the proverbial attachment to a first love in the normal (“On revient toujours à
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ses premiers amours”). Such a connection is especially seen in cases with only
fetichistic determinations of the sexual object. […] In other cases it was mostly a
symbolic thought association, unconscious to the person concerned, which led to
the substitution of the object by means of a fetich. The paths of these connections
cannot always be definitely demonstrated. The foot is a very primitive sexual
symbol already found in myths. Fur is used as a fetich probably on account of its
association with the hairiness of the mons veneris. Such symbolism seems often
to depend on sexual experiences in childhood. (Freud 56-57)
So not only is the sexual object or person being substituted, but the object of fetishism
also acts as a substitution or replacement for the representation of or recreation of a
feeling or memory that was experienced during childhood.
In cases of sexual fetishism, the notion of fixation is probably most well known or
at least most recognized among fetishes. A popular example in our culture is the foot
fetish. A person with a foot fetish will fixate on feet. He will have a quasi obsession with
them. He will return to that same sexual object replacement over and over again to
produce the sexual aim through that means.
Also, if fixation is most apparent in sexual fetishism, then perhaps so is this
notion of fetishism tracing back to a misappropriated value of life. In this case, the act of
sex is the actual physical representation of the production of human life. It is quite
literally a person’s expression of his or her life force. In sexual fetishism, a person
misappropriates his own life force, as well as the creative power for the life force of a
man and woman to produce a child, and attributes that same power to a body part or
object. It is both a perversion and misappropriation of the life force. This perversion and
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misappropriation is especially obvious in that while in tribal fetishism and commodity
fetishism the life force is imagined to be contained within the object, in the case of sexual
fetishism, the object or body part will never have the ability to produce life in the way
that two humans can.
One can also view this perversion from the perspective of the sexual aim.
Considering the act of sex as the ultimate goal, one also sees that the fetish can become
so distorted as to preclude the actual enactment of sex with another person completely.
Freud views these as the worst types of cases. In some of the cases, those afflicted with a
fetish would use the fetish object or body part to encourage stimulation, which eventually
results in copulation with another person. However in the cases that Freud sees as the
worst type of perversion, the other person is eliminated entirely. Sometimes people will
engage only in masturbatory acts stimulated by fetish objects or representation of objects.
For example a person with a foot fetish might engage in masturbation with only shoes or
socks or perhaps even pictures of feet. In this case, the life force of the person, or the
potential to create life, has been entirely wasted as well as misappropriated to the fetish.
In the case of sexual fetishism, as in the previous examples, the fetish marks not
only the misappropriation of the life force, but also the aversion to death. In the case of
tribal fetishism, it was clear that attributing a talisman with the power to bring rain is a
misappropriation of the life force. Through the lens of Freudian disavowal, one can also
see this act as a disavowal of death. In a similar way to the sexual fetish, the tribal fetish
and the commodity fetish are also maneuvers to disavow or in some way avoid a
psychological death, a physical death, or a combination of the two. In the example of
tribal fetishism, one acknowledged that the tribesman’s motivation for using the rain
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talisman was to summon water for the crops, which would produce food to eat, which
would keep him alive that much longer. Earlier, the focus was on the misappropriation of
the life force. Disavowal suggests that the focus be not on the preservation of life, but
rather on the fear or avoidance of death. This may seem like semantics, but it is an
important distinction to make. If the focus is on the preservation of life, then the focus is
on what a person is moving towards. If the focus is on the fear or avoidance of death,
then the focus is on what a person is moving away from.
This difference is crucial in understanding the fetish. If a person move towards a
location, then it is possible that he will eventually arrive at that location, given that he
continues to pursue his course. However, if a person moves away from a location, he will
never arrive there. And yet, he will still be defined in relation to that which he moves
away from, thus never truly escaping. For example, let’s say a person is traveling to
Rome. If he takes the road to Rome for long enough, he will eventually arrive in Rome.
Once he has arrived, his intention has been fulfilled. On the converse however, let’s say a
person is traveling away from Rome. When he leaves Rome, he will set out on the same
road as the previous traveler, only this time, he will be moving in the opposite direction.
However for this traveler, there is no pre-determined point of completion. He can walk
anywhere between one step and one thousand steps away from Rome and technically, he
will no longer be there. Physically, he will no longer be there. However psychologically,
he cannot escape Rome. He is on the road away from Rome, which is technically the
same road to Rome as well. He is still counting his steps away from Rome.
Psychologically, his fixation is upon Rome. It is the object of his thought. What if Rome
were to expand? If so, he would have to keep moving. Thus, due to his constant fixation
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on Rome, the man will continue to move incessantly, with no destination in sight. His
object of intention becomes not a location, as with the previous traveler, but on the act of
movement itself.
This example is an ideological representation of the fetish. The difference
between the man moving toward Rome and the man moving away from Rome is
important because it explains the repetitive fixation upon the fetish. On one level, the
fetish is a metonymy. It is an object that stands in the place of another concept. In our
society, many subjects can be viewed as being culturally or psychologically
metonymical. What is different about the fetish is that the fetish is often preferable to the
source not merely by choice but rather by indefinite compulsion. This seemingly endless
compulsion stems from fear or trauma, as Freud suggested. In the example of a person
moving away from Rome, psychologically Rome would be the psychological site of a
traumatic event. In the example of the tribesman, the traumatic event would be the fear of
death by not raising enough crops. In the example of the Coach consumer, the traumatic
event would be of a psychological death. In this case, the person who obsesses over the
pocketbook fears that she will experience a social death if she is stripped of her
instrumental bearers of status. With the bags, she creates a certain image of herself that
she values with her life. Without them, she fears the death of that image and of that
woman she believed herself to be.
As the old saying goes, “The criminal always returns to the scene of the crime.”
The same is true in the case of trauma. The mind continuously returns to the traumatic
event or incident that caused the damage. The person cannot forget the event and yet at
the same time the person cannot process the event. Though some people may be able to
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overcome this boundary through therapy or other means, fetishists seek to self- medicate
through the use of the fetish. This is the same paradoxical reality of disavowal that
Agamben explains, however applied to the concept of all trauma, as opposed to
specifically of the fear of castration. It is the same, “conflict between the perception of
reality, which urges him to renounce his phantasm, and the counterdesire, which urges
him to deny his perception…” (Agamben 31). In the case of the tribesman, the phantasm
is the false psychological object of a rain talisman conflicting against the reality that he is
dependant upon nature, a force that he does not understand, and thus cannot ensure his
survival. In the case of the Coach consumer, the phantasm is the woman’s psychological
image of herself as a person of status and worth conflicting against the reality that the
purchase of a pocketbook does not enhance her character in any way, and thus her notion
of status is imaginary. In both cases, the fetishists are able to do, “both simultaneously,
reaching one of these compromises that are possible only under the rule of law of the
unconscious,” through the substitution, fixation and obsession on either the talisman or
the Coach pocketbook (31). In this unconscious compromise, a person is continually
walking away from the trauma or fear as the man walks away from Rome. Since he does
not take measures to heal the trauma, be it from childhood or otherwise, the fetishist must
repeatedly affirm his disavowal through the fetish, in a never-ending effort to combat the
repressed knowledge of the real, or of the traumatic reality. Thus, although many subjects
could be labeled as metonymy, only those subjects that incite fear or trauma based
fixation and compulsion can fall under the category of fetish.
At this point, it should be clear that fetishism is composed of the three basic
concepts of absence, substitution, and fixation. This definition is apt to describe tribal
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fetishism, commodity fetishism, and sexual fetishism. The purpose of this threecomponent definition is to reduce fetishism to a concept that can be easily understood and
explained throughout different contexts. So while this thesis has so far only directly
confronted tribal fetishism, commodity fetishism, and sexual fetishism, this definition is
apt to describe not only these three contexts, but any other context of fetishism as well.
Ultimately, this analysis will lead to the examination of fetishism in the context of
modern social media. In addition to the components of absence, substitution, and fixation,
the concepts of fear-based disavowal and the avoidance of physical and/or psychological
death are key to explaining and understanding this new social media fetishism.
As a 21st century psychoanalyst, author, and feminist scholar, Kaplan’s
perspective will enrich the perspectives of Marx and Freud as it will help to bridge those
perspectives with more modern theorists such as Debord and Baudrillard, and can carry
that narrative straight through to present day. In her book, Cultures of Fetishism, Kaplan
is a sherpa, guiding people safely through the world of familiar, making the confusing,
uncomfortable, and strange more understandable, comfortable, and familiar. Her
perspective performs the same functions within this thesis. In addition to Kaplan, Debord
and Baudrillard, 20th century theorists, will help to analyze society in relation to
commodity as well as to explain how fetishism has evolved from the perspectives of
Marx and Freud to the world of social media.
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Chapter II
At this point, one understands the three basic components of fetishism to be
absence, substitution, and fixation. This perspective has helped to link tribal fetishism,
commodity fetishism, and sexual fetishism. While establishing three basic components of
fetishism is helpful to connect different theories through one narrative, if one is to
continue this discourse on fetishism, one must expand that narrative. In her book,
Cultures of Fetishism, Dr. Louise Kaplan discusses the types of fetishism one have
already mentioned as well as many other types and examples of fetishism. She skillfully
connects the bizarre world of fetishism through the narrative of the fetishism strategy.
Understanding Kaplan’s perspective of the fetishism strategy will help us to deepen our
current understanding of fetishism as well as to open our awareness to other aspects of
the fetish that will facilitate connection throughout its seemingly differentiated parts.
When Kaplan discusses the fetish, she uses the term fetishism strategy. The
connotation of the word strategy implies that the use of a fetish might be intentional and
even advantageous. In certain instances, the fetish is negotiated by the unconscious.
While this statement may seem contradictory to that point, it is not. The fetishism
strategy is a strategy of both the conscious and the unconscious minds. The fetish is not
an entity of the conscious or the unconscious but rather as a negotiation between the two.
Under the fetishism strategy, the fetish is what helps us to become familiar with the
unfamiliar. The fetish is the object that forms that bridge. The conscious mind is the land
of the familiar. What one is conscious of, one is aware of. What one is unconscious of,
one is unaware of. What one is unaware of is unfamiliar. In that way, the conscious mind
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is associated with the familiar as the unconscious mind is associated with the unfamiliar.
The fetish is the mediator between the two. Kaplan explains it in this way:
Holding on to something familiar is a good way to approach the
unfamiliar, and when you don’t need the props anymore you can let go of
them. Little children do this with their security blankets, and when they
are ready to move on to a new stage of development, they get rid of them
– or maybe hang on to little shreds as a reminder of feeling safe. (Kaplan
2)
The difference between the security blanket and the fetish is that more than a few shreds
are held on to for safety. Fetishes often become lifestyles. People begin to have a
preference for the fetish. They choose to use the fetish permanently and forego the
opportunity to use the fetish only as a tool to acquaint oneself with the unfamiliar. These
people become so comfortable with the fetish that the effort doesn’t seem worth it to
overcome or acquaint with the unknown. In reference to the types of fetishism one have
discussed, Kaplan asks the questions, “Why is there a need, instead, for a tangible object
that represents the spirit? Why do human beings get so emotionally invested in objects
that are concrete and tangible?” (5). She believes that these matters are an issue of
control:
In contrast to the god or spirit who is ephemeral and intangible, the fetish
exists within the realm of the real and actual world. A fetish can be held,
seen, smelled, even heard if it is shaken, and most importantly it can be
manipulated at the will of the fetishist. In this manner, some essentially
unknowable, intangible, spiritual, and ambiguous “someone” or
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“something” that seems to have a will and energy of its own, is
transformed into something tangible and concretely real and therefore
capable of being controlled and manipulated. (5)
This is the basis of the fetishism strategy. Although the fetish may start off as a way to
become acquainted with the familiar, people often choose to use the fetish as a permanent
solution. They prefer to be in control, even if it means never facing or overcoming their
fears. Thus, they use the fetish to disavow those fears. As long as the person maintains
fixation upon the fetish, he avoids facing the unfamiliar, and thus is able to continuously
disavow its presence. Although he is afraid of the unknown, he is not aware of his own
fear because the fetish, when used as a permanent object and not a temporary tool,
enables him to repress his fear into his unconscious mind.
In describing the fetishism strategy, Kaplan outlines five specific principles in
addition to the points already listed, which correlate with the theories of fetishism one
have mentioned, as well as others. Kaplan’s five principled description of the fetish
enhances my own three-category depiction of the fetish. These classifications serve to
identify distinct lines between different aspects of fetishism, while still unifying those
divided aspects under one unified category. Kaplan’s five principle does not undermine
the notions of absence, substitution, and fixation, but rather explains different types of
absence, substitution, and fixation. While these are five different principles, Kaplan
herself admits that they often overlap or operate in tandem.
Kaplan’s first principle of fetishism explains the substitution of a person or thing:
1. Fetishism is a psychological strategy or defense that enables a human
being to transform something or someone with its own enigmatic energy
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and immaterial essence into something or someone that is material and
tangibly real, a form of being that makes the something or someone
controllable. (6)
Kaplan’s example of this first principle is reality television. In today’s reality television,
“human beings are dehumanized and transformed into mechanical, stereotyped
representations of actual human beings. They become commodities,” (6). A more specific
example of this principle would be the recent hit reality series, The Jersey Shore. One of
the most well known characters on that show is called Snookie, which is not actually her
name. When portrayed in the media, this character is often mocked for her appearance on
the show. There has even been debate as to whether or not the show is scripted, or as to
how much of the show is scripted, because of the way that characters, such as Snookie, so
perfectly fit a pre-determined stereotype. This character has been parodied on other hit
shows such as South Park, Family Guy, and Saturday Night Live. In each example, the
character is portrayed through a stereotype. According to Kaplan, this is what reality T.V.
does when operating through the fetish; it transforms people into commodified,
dehumanized, stereotypes.
In another example, Kaplan compares this first principle of the fetishism strategy
to Marxian commodity fetishism. She references Marx’s mention that the secret of
commodity fetishism is to, “absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus-labour,”
(Marx “The Working-Day”). According to Marx, “Capital is dead labour, that, vampirelike, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The
time during which the labourer works, is the time during which the capitalist consumes
the labour-power he has purchased of him,” (“The Working Day”). Through this quasi-
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vampiric process, the workingman is transformed into the capitalist’s commodity. His life
hours are absorbed by the capitalist either in the from of money or in the form of the
produced commodity. In that way, a person is transformed into something tangible, as the
first principle suggests.
Kaplan’s second principle of fetishism explains the substitution of ambiguity or
uncertainty: “Fetishism transforms ambiguity and uncertainty into something knowable
and certain and in doing so snuffs out any sparks of creativity that might ignite the fires
of fetishism,” (Kaplan 6). This principle can best be related to the rain talisman example.
The tribesman does not know what controls the rain, and thus the survival of his crops,
which is also his own survival, is uncertain and ambiguous. As one discussed earlier, the
fetish or rain talisman acts as a type of security blanket. But since there is no point where
the tribesman learns meteorology, the talisman is not a temporary tool, but rather a
permanent fetish.
Kaplan’s third principle of the fetishism strategy relates to hiding personal details,
preferences, and characteristics: “Fetishism brings uncertain details into the foreground
of experience in order to mask and disguise other features that are thus cast into the
shadows and margins and background,” (6). She relates this principle to Freudian sexual
fetishism. As mentioned earlier, the sexual fetish may arise as a psychological ploy to
avoid thinking about a traumatic event. On the surface, it would appear a person has
strange sexual preferences ad desires. People are often shocked, repelled, or disgusted by
another person’s bizarre sexual fetish. This is exactly how the fetishism strategy works;
“the surface layer, the images that captivate the visual field, the words that clamor to be
heard, are masquerades,” (6). A person is so focused on the bizarre aspects of the fetish
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that he does not question the underlying or unconscious, “desires, motives, and defenses,”
of the fetishist. This works the same way for the fetishist; “the powerful presence of the
erotic surface disguises and covers over the absences that would otherwise remind us of
something traumatic,” (6).
Before moving on to discuss the fourth principle of the fetishism strategy, Kaplan
takes a moment to bring up the subject of necrophilia. At the outset of her studies, Kaplan
believed that necrophilia was, “far away from fetishism,” (7). However after further
research, she realized that, “Necrophilia, it turns out, is the key to a less obvious but, in
certain crucial respects, more essential meaning of fetishism,” (7). Indeed, death is at the
heart of fetishism. Though necrophilia itself is not at the root of all fetishism, it is the
underlying principle and motivations of necrophilia that apply throughout various types
of fetishism. When something is dead, it is at a minimal threat to us. In the first three
examples of the fetishism strategy, one notes the transformation of a human into an
object. In a way, this implies the death of a person, of an idea, or of a concept. If one
transforms that which frightens one into an object, then it is essentially dead and no
longer poses a threat. So while not all fetishism shares the use of a literal cadaver, “in it’s
larger, more encompassing meaning, fetishism is about the deadening and
dehumanization of otherwise alive and therefore threateningly dangerous, unpredictable
desires,” (7).
The fourth principle of the fetishism strategy explains the, “transformation of
living, animate substance into something dead or deadening,” which one might also refer
to as the “necrophilic principle” of fetishism: “The more dangerous and unpredictable the
threat of desire, the more deadened or distanced from human experience the fetish object
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must be,” (7). Under this principle, one can understand necrophiliacs as those who are
extremely terrified of sexual intercourse with a living person. The reason the fetish object
must be dead and distanced comes back to the ability to control. As opposed to, “ a fully
alive, human being with dangerous, unpredictable desires who must be wooed and
courted,” the fetish object is significantly more reliable and controllable (7). As opposed
to a person, the fetish object, “expects neither commitment nor engagement,” and thus is
deemed, “safe, easily available, and undemanding of reciprocity,” (7).
The fourth principle is inextricably tied to the fifth principle of fetishism that
explains the hidden death drive of the fetish object: “The death drive tints itself in erotic
color. The impression of erogenous color draws a mask right on the skin,” (8). Though
this last principle sounds ambiguous, what she means is that negative thoughts and
tendencies will often manifest latently within the fetish and will remain hidden under the
provocative surface of the fetish. Through the fetish, “an entire history is enabled to
masquerade as a detail, anxiety to masquerade as freedom, depression to masquerade as
elation, and hatred to masquerade as love,” (10).
To better understand this last principle, let’s look at an example from
contemporary popular culture. In 2004, author Dinitia Smith produced a feature story
analyzing the hit television series Sex and the City through interviews with several
feminist theorists. Most of the theorists, buying into the manifest surface content of the
show, portrayed the woman as having sexual freedom. However one theorist, Elaine
Showalter, analyzes the show through the lens of fetishism. Showalter notices that the
female lead characters of the show have a, “desperate need to purchase and possess
Manolo Blahnik and Jimmy Choo stiletto shoes and high fashion, high status
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pocketbooks and “sexy” underwear, and suggestively seductive outerwear, was not in the
service of a liberation of their sexuality,” (10). The free sexuality is a masquerade. It is a
distraction. It is anxiety masquerading as freedom. Showalter sees these high fashion
commodities as fetishes, or security blankets comfort these women from their,
“potentially anarchic, chaotic, and unregulated sexuality,” and “otherwise frightening
“anything goes” social environment,” (10). In this unfamiliar and unpredictable world,
the commodity items are familiar reminders of safety. They are a constant point to which
these women can return to as a base or an anchor. As Kaplan mentions in the first
principle, these women take their lack of control over themselves and of their lives and
transform that, “immaterial essence” into a high fashion commodity object, “that is
material and tangibly real, a form of being that makes the something or someone
controllable,” (6).
Now that one can understand the fetishism strategy, next one must further
examine the impact of fetishism on modern society. One of the first theorists to begin
looking at modern society within the context of fetishism is Guy Debord. Debord writes
from a perspective both informed by and inspired by Marx’s view of commodity
fetishism. But Debord is no mere repetition of Marx. Marx talks about the loss of the
value of labor, and thus the misappropriation of the life force and energy of the laborers.
In this line of thought, though the value is distorted, objects would maintain their use and
trade values. Debord not only further seeks to explain, “the obvious degradation of being
into having,” but also to explain the extended loss of use and trade values in what Debord
calls the society of the spectacle, or in other words, a society that values appearing over
being or having (Debord 17).
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The society that Marx discusses is most certainly in the transition from “being
into having,” (17). In the example of the Coach pocketbook, the woman is focused more
on having the item than she is on being any certain way. She is not as focused on her
characteristics and traits. She prefers to let her items represent her. She prefers to be
represented by the pocketbook. Because Coach is a brand name, she can associate herself
with that brand and other wearers of that brand. Coach is known to be a popular,
expensive, brand that sometimes caters to celebrity appeal. In modern society, notions of
celebrity and status often influence capitalistic consumer culture. When a woman buys a
coach bag, she can feel like she shares some sort of status with her favorite celebrity.
Though she realizes she is not an actress on the red carpet, the pocketbook is nonetheless
a signifier of status and wealth, especially among her peers. Due to this effect, the woman
believes that she has achieved being through having. Being is the essence of life. What is
life if not the act of being? Thus, as the commodity fetishist moves from being, she is
distorting the life force. Debord himself notes this quality of the spectacle and inherently
of fetishism to twist and distort a person’s life as well as reality:
The images detached from every aspect of life fuse in a common stream in
which the unity of this life can no longer be reestablished. Reality
considered partially unfolds, in its own general unity, as a pseudo-world
apart, an object of mere contemplation. The specialization of images of the
world is completed in the world of the autonomous image, where the liar
has lied to himself. The spectacle in general, as the concrete inversion of
life, is the autonomous movement of the non-living. (2)
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The fetishist in the society of the spectacle takes another step away from being,
further distorting the life energy. If the example of the Marxian commodity fetishist is a
woman who buys a coach pocketbook, then the example of Debord’s commodity fetishist
is a woman who buys a fake Coach pocketbook. In the society of the spectacle, the next
step away from being after having is appearing. At this point, it no longer matters to the
woman whether or not she can even afford the pocketbook. She knows that in order to
achieve her desired level of status, she only needs the appearance of owning the Coach
pocketbook. Now think of this concept when applied to social media. The woman might
not even buy a Coach pocketbook at all. She may simply borrow a friend’s Coach
pocketbook. Or even worse, she might borrow a friend’s fake Coach pocketbook so that
she can take a picture of herself wearing it. Once she has taken the picture of herself with
the bag, she has achieved the appearance she desires. She can then post this picture as her
avatar or profile picture so that all who see her profile will associate her with the bag, and
if her hopes are fulfilled, with status as well.
The woman who buys a fake pocketbook or borrows one to take a picture is a
logical representation of Debord’s fetishist, however this one example does not
completely encapsulate Debord’s societal criticism. Debord argues that not just some
individuals, but rather the entirety of Western civilization is part of the spectacle. The
spectacle is not so much a personal criticism as it is a societal description for all of
Western civilization. For Debord, the spectacle is society itself, it is, “is nothing other
than the sense of the total practice of a social-economic formation, its use of time. It is
the historical movement in which one are caught,” (11). In Debord’s view, today’s
spectacle is both an extension of and a result of Marxian commodity fetishism. The
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spectacle would not be possible without the world that Marx described. Debord explains
this in his analysis of the spectacle:
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life brought
into the definition of all human realization the obvious degradation of
being into having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by
the accumulated results of the economy leads to a generalized sliding of
having into appearing, from which all actual “having” must draw its
immediate prestige and its ultimate function. At the same time all
individual reality has become social reality directly dependent on social
power and shaped by it. It is allowed to appear only to the extent that it is
not. (17)
First people had to make the transition from being into having. It is the time spent
in the period of having that allows the spectacle to become possible. It is the time spent
focusing on having as well as the technological ability to spread appearances. At first,
people could purchase objects and having would be enough because those people would
be the only one to possess those individual objects. After a while, as production became
more technologically advanced, it was easier to make copies. Instead of a person buying a
painting from a famous artist, he could just as easily buy a replicated print, for even
cheaper. It is the accessibility to commodities and their replications that has rendered the
cheap appearance preferable to the expensive original. At the same time, having an
original becomes less valuable because of the amount of copies and replications. Even a
person who has an original copy might be mistaken for someone who has bought a
replica. And although the person who bought the original might make efforts to explain
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himself, the fact that he must explain himself at all is the mark of the spectacle. At this
point, a person with an original paining must answer to the spectacle if he wishes to
maintain his prestige. He must exert an effort to explain to his guests where and how he
obtained an original painting. And yet, even still, the man’s guests may walk away
believing that the image was merely a copy or replica and that the man was a liar. It is the
effort that the man must make to explain, as well as the chance that his efforts may be in
vain, that begin to render the image or appearance preferable to the real. In a modern
production society, it is simpler to acquire appearances, whether they are copies, replicas,
or falsehoods.
In this world of copies, one must take notice that originality has become lost. Or
in other words, it has become absent. The more one understands the spectacle, the more it
becomes clear that the spectacle itself is a grandiose societal fetish. It is the magnification
of the commodity fetish to a mass scale. In the example of the commodity fetish, people
were focused on products. The commodity fetish thrived in a world that existed before
the popularity and proficiency of media. The spectacle is what’s on television. The
spectacle is what’s in the movie theaters. The spectacle is what’s on the news and what’s
at the mall. The spectacle is the entire system of the marketplace as a fetish. If this is not
clear, let us examine the notion of the spectacle from the three basic components of the
fetish.
The first component of the fetish is absence. In the case of the spectacle, what is
absent would be what Debord might refer to as being. There is an absence of social
interaction. There is an absence of connection between individuals. According to Debord,
“The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated
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by images,” (4). There is a loss of intimacy when speaking of sexual fetishism. When
ones talk about the spectacle, one is talking about a loss of intimacy and human
connection through societal and hierarchical separation and segregation. The mainstream
media facilitates this disconnection. The spectacle, more or less, is the mainstream media.
It is the history of people through the connection to production and products. Debord
attempts to explain this:
Separation is the alpha and omega of the spectacle. The institutionalization
of the social division of labor, the formation of classes, had given rise to a
first sacred contemplation, the mythical order with which every power
shrouds itself from the beginning. […] Thus all separate power has been
spectacular, but the adherence of all to an immobile image only signified
the common acceptance of an imaginary prolongation of the poverty of
real social activity, still largely felt as a unitary condition. […] The
spectacle is the preservation of unconsciousness within the practical
change of the conditions of existence. It is its own product, and it has
made its own rules: it is a pseudo-sacred entity. It shows what it is:
separate power developing in itself, in the growth of productivity by
means of the incessant refinement of the division of labor into a
parcellization of gestures which are then dominated by the independent
movement of machines; and working for an ever-expanding market. All
community and all critical sense are dissolved during this movement in
which the forces that could grow by separating are not yet reunited. (25)
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In this passage, Debord is explaining the history of the spectacle from the beginning of
time. He is explaining how the spectacle begins with separation. First comes the
separation and specialization of labor and classes. This division of labor and production
makes people feel alienated from one other. It makes it so that people are now on
different levels of society and thus it is harder for them to connect. But this is what I am
talking about when I speak of the spectacle as an illusory reality. The spectacle of
separation due to different classes is a social construction. At a basic level, people are
still humans. They are not that much different from any other human on this planet when
it comes to physicality. The true difference between these people is the difference in their
experience and personality. But these differences of experience and personality are not
what separate people. It is the spectacle or social construction that separates people.
Personality and experience can be shared. People can have conversations and can connect
with one another. But they do not. People feel as if they can only interact with their own
class. Or if it is not a feeling, it is a reality due to the fact that the poor do not have the
same access as the rich. The rich can travel to any location with their money. They can
engage with the lower classes if they choose. However since the spectacle is created by
the separation of power, those with class and wealth have deliberately separated, and thus
do not often choose to engage with lower classes. The lower classes are isolated and
alienated. They are often confined to the neighborhoods that they were born in. If they do
not have money to leave the neighborhood, then they cannot. In this type of world, what
ends up happening is that people do not interact with many different types of people.
They interact mainly with their own class. And even still, rather then interact with their
own class, they feel the pull of the spectacle. They feel the need to direct their attention
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and gaze towards it. This is what Debord is talking about when he mentions, “poverty of
real social activity, still largely felt as a unitary condition.” People are lacking for social
interaction. People crave social interactions and experiences that they do not have, and
they are tricked into believing that the spectacle will provide them with these
experiences. In reality, what they seek is intimacy, enlightenment, and connection. It is
almost tragic that in their noble search, they are fooled into believing that the separation,
degradation, and disconnection of the spectacle will provide them with what they search
for. Under these circumstances, it should be clear that the absence of the fetish is the
absence of direct social interaction. It is the interaction of people un-mediated by images
and unmediated by products.
What is amazing about the spectacle fetish is that it would seem that most are
unaware that they are a part of it. It is more of an unconscious fetish. As opposed to the
talisman, which is consciously carved, the pocketbook, which is consciously bought, or
the sexual fetish object, which is consciously used, the spectacle fetish is chosen
sometimes by choice, but sometimes by ignorance. It is chosen in that people believe this
is what will bring them more of a full life but instead does not. It leaves them in the
constant cycle of the fetish that is always moving away and is never arriving. At this
point in time, the number one cause of unnatural death is suicide. America is known
across the world for its anti-depressant pharmaceutical industry, and yet even still, the
number one cause of unnatural death is suicide. If America’s leading cause of death is
suicide, and if one of its most well known products is anti-depressants, then people are
sad. People are unhappy because there is a part of them that realizes, at some level, that
they have been tricked. Or perhaps it is not so much that these people realize that they
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have been tricked, but rather that these people still feel a lack. They still feel the lack of
social interaction. There is a part of them that craves presence and awareness, as opposed
to the constant distraction of the spectacle. In previous examples, disavowal is marked by
a choice. In the example of the spectacle fetish, there is both a conscious and an
unconscious disavowal. For some, there is an unconscious disavowal within the fetish of
the spectacle because for them, it is an unconscious societal fetish that almost everyone is
a part of. For these people, there is an unconscious disavowal of unhappiness. These
would be the people that do not realize that working every day, coming home and
watching television for news and a couple of hit shows, and purchasing products from the
marketplace is not a way of life, but rather a substitution for life. For these people, the
disavowal is of both life and sadness. These people refuse to accept that they need a
change in their lives. They refuse to accept the part of their psyche that craves direct,
unmediated by images, human interaction. And so, they disavow this part of themselves.
They create an absence of awareness, and though unconsciously, play directly into the
hands of the spectacle fetish.
However there is also a group of people that consciously submerge themselves
within the spectacle, and thus are making a conscious disavowal. People who dedicate
their lives to keeping up with the Kardashians, the newest apple products, and coolest
fashion trends are disavowing being, or life itself. The spectacle fetish has many
similarities with this negation, although the terms are different. Debord speaks of the
spectacle in terms of an appearance that negates a person’s life:
The concept of spectacle unifies and explains a great diversity of apparent
phenomena. The diversity and the contrasts are appearances of a socially
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organized appearance, the general truth of which must itself be
recognized. Considered in its own terms, the spectacle is affirmation of
appearance and affirmation of all human life, namely social life, as mere
appearance. But the critique which reaches the truth of the spectacle
exposes it as the visible negation of life, as a negation of life which has
become visible. (10)
The people who are actively choosing to immerse themselves in the spectacle are making
a conscious disavowal, and thus they are intentionally negating life for the superficial
spectacle. These people have given up on being. They have resolved the issue of lack of
being by deciding that they do not need to be. They have committed to a life of
appearances. They have learned to disavow any feelings of hollowness that may
accompany a life of appearances. Or as Debord would say, “Separated from his product,
man himself produces all the details of his world with ever increasing power, and thus
finds himself ever more separated from his world. The more his life is now his product,
the more he is separated from his life,” (33). This is somewhat of a paradox. At one level,
man is creating his world. He is the one that builds the products and commodities, and
thus “produces all the details of his world.” And yet, on another level, the more man
creates his world, the less he is a part of that world. Intuitively, it would seem as if the
opposite were true. It would seem as if the more man creates the world, the more he
becomes liked to it. There are a few reasons why this seemingly contradictory
information is an accurate description of the workingman’s paradox. In Debord’s words,
“The spectacle is capital to such a degree of accumulation that it becomes an image,”
(35). As the man works to create more commodities, he does not have the time to
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experience them. As mentioned earlier, with certain commodities, the man that builds the
commodity might not be able to acquire enough capital or excess labor to purchase the
commodity. In this scenario, the man is producing one of the details of his world in the
sense that he actually helped to assemble the commodity and yet is separated from the
world market in which the commodity is sold in the sense that he does not have the
capital to act as a consumer in that market. If this man is creating a world, it is not for
himself, but for the elite. He produces for the President of his company who makes
millions of dollars a day without lifting a finger and is granted the privilege to
international travel access and the ability to consume as he pleases. The poor produce for
the rich. The rich consume the poor. It is the classic Marxian class struggle. It is the
struggle of the 99% against the 1% as it has been phrased recently in the media through
the Occupy Wall Street protests. In this world the workingman’s life is one of producing
commodities that he cannot consume. His life becomes work. His life becomes building
tangible commodities that he can never truly touch, commodities that he can only dream
to possess. To him, these commodities are not actualities. They are images. They are
icons. They are symbols of his work and of his wasted life and time. They are symbols of
the life he has lost, or the life he has devoted to the production of the commodity so that
he may earn enough capital to buy the food that keeps his corpse animated. And yet, the
workingman is not without commodities. Though he may not be able to buy the more
expensive commodities, there are poorer men than him. In the Western world, many
companies outsource cheaper labor to outside of the country where the labor laws are not
so strict. These workers, who are almost slaves, help to produce the world of the
workingman. The workingman works so that he may buy food, but also the cheaper
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commodities. He seeks to emulate the rich and famous in a microcosm. Though he cannot
reach their scale, he aims to reflect this image as best as he can, while still surviving and,
“The abundance of commodities, namely, of commodity relations, can be nothing more
than increased survival,” (40).
In this day and age, the major commodity of is the television or sometimes
referred to as the opiate of the masses. People can simply watch television. Television is
the spectacle box. There is no stronger proponent of the spectacle than the television,
which allows the workingman a peak into the lives of the rich and famous. It is the
television that makes the workingman feel as if he needs these commodities and needs to
work waster his life earning the capital to acquire them. In modern culture, a popular
meme is the zombie meme, as evident in the Resident Evil series, Call of Duty’s Nazi
Zombies, and AMC’s The Walking Dead. A zombie can be defined as a human corpse
that is animate, but does not contain the typical characteristics of life. For the zombie,
there is an extreme lack of psychological awareness. The zombie seeks only to consume.
All that the zombie knows is survival. It is not a coincidence that at this point in time, the
zombie meme is so popular in American culture. The ability of people to identify with the
zombie meme as well as its current popularity is a reflection of the collective
unconscious. Collectively, there is an unconscious or unconscious awareness of our half
brain dead constantly consuming society. In the same way that fetishists use the fetish
object as a means of finding comfort, I believe the conscious mind uses the zombie meme
as a fetish to represent the unconscious awareness of our current, unfortunate, societal
condition of mass consumption. This type of comfort seeking is what Kaplan is referring
to when she discusses the fetishism strategy. The image of the zombie is familiar, and
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thus acts as a security blanket for the conscious. While the conscious mind is appeased
and distracted, the unconscious mind latches on to the latent content of the zombie meme.
To strengthen this point, one can also take a look at the vampire meme. This is another
popular meme in our current Western society as one have seen with the recent explosion
of novel series such as Twilight that also has a hit movie following and television hit
series such as True Blood and Vampire Diaries. The vampire meme is another
representation of an animated corpse that must constantly consume in order to survive. At
the same time, these vampires represent a smaller percentage of the population that preys
upon the larger population, which resonates with the Occupy Wall Street protests of the
99% against the 1%.
Largely, these memes, as well as Debord’s theory, are signifiers of a culture that
is in transition from the focus on being and experiencing, to having and consuming. The
masses endlessly produce for the upper echelons of society, who have the money and
freedom to actually experience. These elite of society have both the money to acquire
almost any physical possession that they might desire as well as the ability to travel to
any location at more or less any time. Through the majority of society’s struggles to
work, obtain, and consume, the elite is able to enjoy, relax, and experience. As one
continue this cycle, it becomes harder and harder for the working class to obtain those
objects which they seek. As the population continues to increase exponentially along with
the steady rise and inflation, it now requires significantly more hours of time working for
the average person to buy a car today than to buy one just forty or fifty. The ability to
obtain and to have is becoming more and more difficult for the average person. With this
difficulty present, society has begun to shift its focus off of having. As having becomes a
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greater struggle with odds that increase every single day, society is shifting its focus to
something easier. Society is beginning to let go of the idea of having, and has now
become infatuated with the idea of appearing. If one is focused on one’s appearances,
then one does not need to have as much. One only needs enough having to cover the
surface layer. For example, with an emphasis on having, one might buy a gold watch.
With an emphasis on appearing, one may simply buy a cheaper copper watch that is
covered in gold. Thus, there is less having of the actual gold but for the same appearance
value. The appearance is cheaper and easier to obtain than the actual product. Theorist
Jean Baudrillard is aware of this change, and makes a comment that if society shifts focus
in this way, society may eventually lose all traces of the original. In the next chapter, one
analyze the work of Jean Baudrillard, who picks up where Debord left off, as he analyzes
this new shift from having to appearing as it is manifest throughout simulated society.
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Chapter III
About twenty years after the publication of Debord’s Society of the Spectacle,
theorist Jean Baudrillard published Simulacra and Simulation, which follows the
narrative of the societal shift from having to appearing. At the beginning of his book,
Baudrillard reminds the reader of Borges fable:
…the cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends
up covering the territory exactly (the decline of the Empire witnesses the
fraying of this map, little by little, and its fall into ruins, though some
shreds are still discernible in the deserts - the metaphysical beauty of this
ruined abstraction testifying to a pride equal to the Empire and rotting like
a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, a bit as the double ends by
being confused with the real through aging)… (Baudrillard 3)
While Baudrillard agrees that this metaphor is not a direct or completely accurate
representation, this picture of the map overlaying reality is an image well suited to
facilitate understanding a complex theory. In Baudrillard’s updated version of this
metaphorical image, the map is no longer overlaying reality, but rather it has replaced
reality. In other words, society is further along its transition from having to appearing.
Society is at the point where it has abandoned having almost entirely. In reference to
earlier examples, society is continuing forward from the ideas of faking the real. Society
is moving from owning a fake designer pocketbook, to taking a picture of one with a
friend’s designer pocketbook, to taking a picture of one with a friend’s fake designer
pocketbook. As society progresses, the real becomes less and less present. In the original
example of Borges fable, the fraying of the map coincides with the crumbling of the
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Empire. In Baudrillard’s version, “it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the
extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in
the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. The desert of the real itself,”
(3). Reality is fading away as the simulation takes its place. The real may still exist, but
only in fragments, here and there. In fact, returning to the example of the pocketbook,
let’s take it a step further. Now that photo-editing applications are available via the
Internet to just about anybody, one doesn’t even need to borrow an actual object
anymore. Society is at the point where one can edit oneself, or possibly even just one’s
face, onto a pre-existing picture. At this stage, the real is almost entirely absent. Once
again, while the idea of editing a picture of us with a designer pocketbook is not a perfect
metaphor, it is a working example of Baudrillard’s theory in action. Clearly, society has
not yet reached a complete disappearance of the real. People still buy pocketbooks, both
authentic and replica. But this is not the point. The focus lies in the societal shift. While
not every individual has been consumed by the simulation, and surely there must be those
clinging to shreds of reality, the number of individuals who invest time, money, and
energy into simulated versions of reality is increasing while the number of individuals
who invest time, money, and energy into physical reality is decreasing. At the same time,
modes and platforms of simulated reality have been dramatically increasing over the past
few decades, presently manifesting primarily through various social media sources, but
previously through other electronic media. The focus on the real has declined as one have
progressed from theater, to television, to video arcades, to computers, to video game
consoles, to portable handheld video games, to cell phones, to smart phones with direct
access to the globally connected Internet. With so many options of simulated realities to
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choose from, it is no wonder why less children spend time playing outside and why the
ones who do come inside earlier than those born before the explosion of simulation
technology during our current digital age. If one was born in this age, perhaps one might
not notice a shift at all. Even parents might not see a drastic change. But if one is to view
this progression from the perspective of a grandparent or elder, it is an obvious
difference. And for the scholar, who can time travel through the centuries via the medium
of text and literature, it is undeniable that this shift has been occurring for the past few
hundred years. For the scholar, it is a blatant red flag, screaming for analysis. And indeed,
this scholar cannot help but to crave an answer as to why one society is moving in this
direction, where society find itself if it continues along this pattern, and what the
implications of following this pattern are for humanity.
For example, just thirty years ago a watch that has video-chat capabilities was
seen as high-tech spy equipment from the future. Today, any kindergartener with an ipad
and Internet access can video-chat, not to mention that some people actually do own
video-chat watches. As one imagines what is possible, one yearns to create what one had
previously believed was impossible. This is just a small example of the technology now
available, as Google performs research on cars that can drive themselves, boasting to
finish developing the technology within the next three to five years. While this does not
mean they will release a self-driving car at this time, nor does it mean government
regulation would allow it, it is still an obvious indicator of the direction in which society
is heading. As one realizes the possibility of self-driving cars, one must also begin to
consider that science fiction movies may be more forecast than they are fantasy.
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This idea of the idea preceding the reality is consistent with Baudrillard’s theory
and metaphor of the map:
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - precession of simulacra that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is
the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. (3)
If one can look at theorists, scientists, and filmmakers who speculate about the future as
society’s cartographers, then one can see how the maps they are creating overlap with the
real. They are no longer mapping the territory. The map does not conform to the territory.
They are mapping what they predict. They are mapping what they believe will happen. In
accordance with those maps, and in accordance with their beliefs, reality conforms to the
prediction. The map precedes the territory, eroding what used to be there, as it imprints
its own design upon the ever-decaying landscape.
This concept is similar to the scene in the movie Inception where one sees a den
of people who have spent entire lifetimes in dream space, choosing to believe that
perception is reality. In Inception, these dreamers pay an operator to maintain their bodies
and minds in a permanent dream state. In this scenario, the dreamers are able to map out
the lives that they want to live and then live them. To them, it does not matter that their
dreams are not real in the traditional sense. They prefer the control and stability of the
dream world. Even knowing that they will never interact with real individuals, only
projections of their own unconscious minds, they do not care. In the real world, these
individuals appear almost as zombies or comatose victims. For these individuals, the real
has disappeared completely. They live only in a world of appearances and imagined
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experiences. For these perpetual dreamers, Baudrillard’s prediction has come true; the
territory has disappeared and only the map remains.
It is shocking how well Baudrillard’s assessment of reality in the 1980s
corresponds with our current situation, as well as Inception’s representational projection
of our current situation:
It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It
is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say
of an operation of deterring every real process via its operational double, a
programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all the
signs of the real and shortcircuits all its vicissitudes. Never again will the
real have the chance to produce itself - such is the vital function of the
model in a system of death, or rather of anticipated resurrection, that no
longer even gives the event of death a chance. A hyperreal henceforth
sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real
and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models
and for the simulated generation of differences. (Baudrillard 4)
When Baudrillard describes substitution of “the signs of the real for the real,” one can see
this as a direct description of the Inception dream world. However this cal also be seen as
a description of the world now. There are many individuals who choose to substitute the
signs of the real for the real through engagement in social media and virtual realities.
One popular alternate virtual reality that substitutes signs of the real for the real is
the video game Call of Duty. This is an entire video game series that focuses upon
placing the player in the position of a soldier in the middle of a war zone. In this game,

Lepkowsky 58
players can engage an interactive single player story that follows the beginning of a war
to a victory. Many of the wars in these games are even modeled after real events,
although they do not maintain perfect historical accuracy. This game also contains the
option for players to compete online against players from all over the world. In this
multiplayer online setting the players are split into two teams. The goal of each player is
to murder as many of the other team’s players as possible while simultaneously avoiding
being murdered by the other team. The player who can either murder the most players in
a time frame or be the first to reach a certain number of murder points is declared the
winner. Call of Duty is the type of game with a cult following. These players are not
playing any mere game; they are substituting hours of their lives to become simulated
soldiers who engage in simulated murders. This is one of the most modern forms of the
fetish that exemplifies the hyperreal of which Baudrillard speaks. This behavior is
consistent with the absence of reality during the time played, the substitution of that
reality with a simulated virtual reality, and the fixation upon that simulated virtual reality
characterized by hours per week or even per day spent engaged in interaction. At present,
society does not have the technology of Inception to permanently suspend people in an
alternate reality, however if there is already a culture of fetishism surrounding these
simulated virtual realities, and this just being one of countless options, then one can see
how society is already on the path to the hyperreal.
In studying fetishism, one is also studying a societal affliction. As Kaplan details,
when engaging with the fetish, one is intentionally seeking to deaden the experience of
life. Analyzing a possible future is of the utmost importance because one must
acknowledge that the presence of virtual reality and virtual interaction, whether through

Lepkowsky 59
video games, social media platforms, or other Internet related simulation, is only
increasing. Since these virtual realities are fetishes, it is urgent that they be understood as
early as possible. The fixation of a fetish is intense. Once entranced by the fixation of a
fetish, one finds it is difficult to escape its clutches. People often are not even aware of
their fetishes and thus are not even taking action to escape or overcome them. This can be
dangerous especially when one is discussing the example of a video game such as Call of
Duty. In Call of Duty, the players are strictly adhering to the principles of fetishism as
they are trading the potentially physically dangerous conditions of real life for the
psychological comforts of creating death. Of course, there is an aspect to these games that
the player will be killed and will lose the game, so there is some courage on that part of
the player to risk at least a psychological death, although it should be noted that video
game deaths often do produce violent reactions in real life, such as throwing a controller
or screaming out expletives. However ultimately, the chance of winning and the
continuous victory of exceptional gamers is enough to create comfort, security, and
pleasure, through the virtual re-creation of the murderous environment of a war zone.
And while Call of Duty is already an excellent example of fetishistic simulated reality, it
becomes the perfect example when one realizes the Nazi Zombies feature included with
the more recently released editions such as Call of Duty: World at War and Call of Duty:
Black Ops. While these editions feature the same basic format of the previous games,
they include the added bonus of the Nazi Zombie challenge min-game within the game. In
the Nazi Zombie challenge, players are spawned in a territory or level that is infested with
zombies with the objective of eliminating all of them. Once the player has eliminated all
zombies, there is a brief pause before the zombies spawn again, but now on a level 2
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difficulty, meaning that there may be more of them, or that they are harder to kill. This
continues endlessly. While the highest recorded level reached is over 100, there is no end
to the game other than the player’s death. Also, the game cannot be paused and so to
reach higher rounds, players must commit hours upon hours of their time. An average
round time may be anywhere between three and eight hours. So basically, players
continue to engage in the same exact repetitive task of killing zombies on the same exact
level in the same exact way. One can see how these players become the simulated
zombies they kill. They lose all signs of life other than a will to continue playing as
zombies lose all signs of life other than the will to continue consuming. Even more so
than the regular game, those players of Nazi Zombies are seeking comfort through
deadening or zombifying themselves. Through the contradictions of seeking comfort
through life in deadening that are evident in the example of this game one is reminded of
the paradoxical agreement orchestrated by the unconscious mind. One must question the
logic of seeking comfort in life through death and deadening.
The paradoxical behavior of the unconscious mind to seek life through death or
vice versa is both perplexing and intricate. In an essay titled Evil and The Death Instinct,
Psychiatrist Zvi Lothane analyzes Freud’s Beyond The Pleasure Principle to explain this
logic. He also analyzes the work of Sabina Spielrein, a psychoanalyst and student of Carl
Jung’s whose writings on the life instinct and death instinct inspired Freud, and of
Wilhelm Stekel who was, “a founding member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society
who was later marginalized by Freud and expelled,” (Lothane 278). Examining Freud’s
Beyond The Pleasure Principle as well as the work of his students on the same topic will
help to explain the seemingly paradoxical nature of the fetish. Stekel writes on the
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conflict between life and death, and names these urges Eros after the Greek God of Love,
representing life energy and the life instinct, and Thanatos after the Greek God of Death,
representing death energy and the death instinct. While Stekel’s writings are in German,
Lothane translates a portion of a dream analysis in which Stekel refers to these concepts:
Just as in the dream there is generally no negation, there is similarly no
negation of life. Dying in dreams most often means living and it is
precisely the highest life’s pleasures that finds its expression in a death
wish… such ideas were reportedly spoken of by poets and philosophers,
too, have repeatedly highlighted these connections between Eros and
Thanatos. (Lothane 278)
Lothane also provides us with an excerpt from Spielrein’s essay in which she quotes
Jung’s perspective on Eros and Thanatos (though again the terms are not used directly):
The passionate yearning, i.e., the libido, has two sides: the power that
beautifies all and one that on occasion destroys… the destructive nature of
the creative power… To become generative means to destroy oneself,
since the becoming of the next generation means that the preceding one
has reached its peak: In this way our descendants are our most dangerous
enemies, with whom one cannot cope… The anxiety over the erotic fate is
understandable, for there is something unforeseen in it… He who
renounces the courage to experience, must stifle in himself the wish to
commit a kind of suicide. This explains why death fantasies readily
accompany erotic wishes. (Lothane 278-279)

Lepkowsky 62
By looking at these two quotations, one can see that the dualistic nature of life and death,
be it discussed under the name of Eros and Thanatos, or of the Libido, or of the death
drive, or of those principles which lie beyond pleasure and pain. One can see differences
between these different descriptions and it is difficult to say that just one of these
individuals is correct. Through an all-encompassing perspective, one can realize that each
one of these individuals, despite their disagreements, are all focused on the exact same
topic of the fetish but under differing terms.
In Stekel’s psychoanalysis, he comments that life’s greatest pleasures often
express themselves in the form of a death-wish dream scenario. According to Freud,
dreams are psychological manifestations of the dreamer’s unconscious desires. However
Freud also subscribes to the pleasure principle that says humans are basically wired to
engage in those behaviors, which maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Logically, it
does not make sense that seeking death would be a form of avoiding pain or of attaining
pleasure. It is this contradiction that inspires analysis. Why is it that a person who adheres
to the pleasure principle might unconsciously seek death? For what reason could death be
unconsciously pleasurable? Or what could be so painful that a person might
unconsciously choose death to avoid it? Carl Jung, another former student of Freud,
provides one perspective that might explain, “why death fantasies readily accompany
erotic wishes,” (279). Jung begins his analysis by positing that the libido, or sex drive,
has a dualistic yet conflicting beautifying and destructive nature. Jung resolves this
conflict by supposing the act of generation, or of creation of life, which is the ultimate
aim of the sex drive, is in itself an act of self-destruction. Jung sees generation of life as a
mark of the expiration of the usefulness of the generator. In Jung’s perspective, the only
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reason one is so driven, the only reason that the sex drive is so powerful, is because it’s
primary function is a response to death.
Biologically, and thus on some unconscious level, the body realizes that it will
perish, and thus must reproduce in order to pass on its genetic information so that
although the body may be lost, the genes that created it are still present within the
progeny. In Jung’s view, one is aware, whether consciously or unconsciously that our
ancestors were the ones that created us, and that they have disappeared into death. Jung
refers to them as “our greatest enemies,” but what he means is that they are reminders of
our greatest fears of death with which one “cannot cope.” When he mentions the anxiety
over the erotic fate that contains an unforeseeable component, he is pointing out that to
live is a commitment to constantly be on the lookout for death risks. If one commits to
the life urge, then one is willingly and knowingly engaging with danger. It is an
understandable fear because any person alive can acknowledge that life is filled with
risks that often produce fear. However one all experience varying levels of this fear.
Some are able to come to such terms with fear that they engage in death-defying acts
such as skydiving, mountain climbing, scuba diving, etc. On the other end of the
spectrum are those who are so afraid of the dangers of life that they become somewhat
neurotic, committing themselves to lives of hermitage, attempting to leave the house as
little as possible. One can imagine the stereotypical germophobe who is so afraid of dirt
that he will not leave his house and develops an obsessive-compulsive need to constantly
clean. It is this end of the spectrum to which Jung refers when he speaks of those who
renounce the courage to experience. These people who are trying to protect themselves
from the outside world, who don’t even try to face the world with courage but rather
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choose to attempt controlling their level of fear through avoidance must also be
simultaneously suppressing an unconscious desire for suicide. For these people, the
amount of fear the outside world creates within them becomes so difficult to manage, so
unpleasurable, that perhaps suicide would seem preferable as an end to the psychological
pain of chronic fear for these people. This struggle is a question of which is stronger, the
desire to acquire pleasure or the desire to avoid pain. Returning to the example of dreams,
these people who try to avoid danger through hermitage may dream of dying in a sky
diving accident. If the person were fully committed to the death drive, then he would
indeed have committed suicide and would not be dreaming. But the fact that he is alive to
be dreaming means that he has not yet made a full commitment to the death drive, or to
the complete avoidance of pain through death, and so if one see him dreaming of dying
while skydiving, one are merely seeing the simultaneous expression of two mutually
exclusive desires, which as Stekel says may be why it is “precisely the highest life’s
pleasures that finds its expression in a death wish.”
In Beyond The Pleasure Principle, Freud notices the contradiction of seeking life
through death or vice versa and seeks to come to a new understanding of the operation of
the conscious and unconscious mind that encompasses and accounts for his earlier
writing. Through speculation, Freud is able to tactfully describe a new way of
interpreting the relationship between conscious and unconscious that does not contradict
the pleasure principle, but rather describes a process that operates simultaneously and
separately from the pleasure principle. At times, these two processes may intersect and
possibly create fiction or confusion, but ultimately, these two processes are able to
coexist.
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Freud frames his argument through the perspective of understanding a human, or
a living organism, in terms of “an undifferentiated vesicle of sensitive substance: then its
surface, exposed as it is to the outer world, is by its very position differentiated and
serves as an organ for receiving stimuli,” (Freud 5). Citing Embryology as evidence,
Freud describes how the sensitive brain and other vital organs form first, but are
vulnerable and without protection. Then, these vital and living cells produce the partially
deadened outer layer, or in other words the human body that has dead skin cells
constantly flaking off of it and yet also contains sensory receptors that relay information
back to the brain and vital organs. These vital organs are controlled by the unconscious
mind. So it is the unconscious mind and brain that realize the need for “protection against
stimuli from the outer world,” (Freud 8) and create both the body with sensory receptors
and the conscious mind with perception, which are both somewhat deadened compared to
the brain and vital organs. The conscious mind, though connected to the unconscious
mind, is dead to the activity of the vital processes. One does not consciously pump one’s
blood, nor breathe at night, nor a myriad of other autonomic functions. Freud describes
the advantage and function of this death layer:
…The outer layer has by its own death secured all the deeper layers from a
like fate—at least so long as no stimuli present themselves of such a
strength as to break through the protective barrier. For the living organism
protection against stimuli is almost a more important task than reception
of stimuli; the protective barrier is equipped with its own store of energy
and must above all endeavour to protect the special forms of energy-
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transformations going on within itself from the equalising and therefore
destructive influence of the enormous energies at
work in the outer world. (6)

In this way, the conscious mind acts as both a barrier and a filter for different pleasurepain stimuli from the outer world, otherwise known as exogenous pain. If the outer layer
and conscious mind perform optimally, then they will protect the unconscious mind from
the painful stimuli of the outer world and will integrate the pleasurable stimuli of the
outer world. Freud does also mention that at certain times, pain and pleasure do arise
from the inner world, otherwise known as endogenous pain. The difference between the
two is whereas pleasure is experienced gracefully, inner pain (a psychological anguish
such as grief, guilt, frustration, etc.) sets off the barrier protection and defense reaction.
Since the pain is coming from inside though, the barrier of the conscious mind cannot be
applied to it, and so, this is the root of projection. One projects those qualities within
oneself that disturb one onto those around one so that it will be easier to protect oneself
against them. There are also other exceptions to the system of outer protection and inner
operation, the most important of all being trauma; “such external excitations as are strong
enough to break through the barrier against stimuli one call traumatic,” (9). Trauma is
especially significant in this context and in this perspective. One sees here in Freud’s
analysis that trauma is indeed the first domino that sets off the chain reaction of the
fetishism response or what Kaplan refers to as the fetishism strategy. To an extent, it is
the trauma that is being strategized against. But Freud does not see it this way exactly.
Freud describes the event as a type of psychic binding:
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An occurrence such as an external trauma will undoubtedly provoke a
very extensive disturbance in the workings of the energy of the organism,
and will set in motion every kind of protective measure. But the pleasureprinciple is to begin with put out of action here. The flooding of the
psychic apparatus with large masses of stimuli can no longer be prevented:
on the contrary, another task presents itself—to bring the stimulus under
control, to ‘bind’ in the psyche the stimulus mass that has broken its way
in, so as to bring about a discharge of it. (9)
In other words, the pleasure principle is the guiding principle that guides the function and
operation of the conscious mind and sensory organs. However the pleasure principal does
not supremely rule the unconscious mind and vital organs. Instead, it would seem that it
is the unconscious mind itself that created the pleasure principal for the conscious mind
to adhere to as a means of protection. So it should not be a surprise that the creator of this
principal is not bound by it. When a traumatic event has broken the barrier against stimuli
it has bi-passed the conscious and entered directly into the realm of the unconscious.
Apparently, the unconscious follows an alternate system of principles when it comes to
dealing with trauma, and that this system takes priority over and supercedes the pleasure
principle. The way this system works is that the unconscious mind in combination with
the vital organs must produce enough energy to combat the energy of the trauma through
binding. Part of this binding process involves apprehension and fear. According to Freud,
if one is experiencing a trauma, then one’s systems of apprehension were not pre-charged
enough to receive the charge of the trauma and thus flooding occurs. Freud believes that
part of the reason one are conditioned to remember fear is “the failure of the mechanism
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of apprehension to make the proper preparation, including the over-charging of the
systems first receiving the stimulus,” (11). Part of this fear and apprehension is that the
conscious layer of the mind becomes wounded its then more sensitive to trauma. When
Freud describes the psychic binding of traumatic events he mentions that the energy
required to bind the event is taken from the sensory organs and conscious mind. What
this means is that part of the conscious energy that was being used as a force of
protection has now been re-allocated and assigned to act as a binding agent. This reallocated energy can no longer be used as a protective force of the conscious mind and
sensory organs until the bind is release and the trauma has been healed. Thus, until the
bind is released, the conscious mind becomes weaker to other traumatic events, as it has
lost some of its protective force. For example, let’s look at the extreme example of a
physically abusive relationship. In these situations, there is so much trauma that the
conscious mind has become entirely compromised. After repeated incidents of trauma
and abuse, the conscious mind has either almost entirely or entirely depleted itself of its
protective energy or force. All of its energy is trapped in the psychic binds of the
previous trauma, and so there is nothing left to protect against incoming trauma. Thus, it
is often the case with these types of relationships that the victim of the abuse becomes so
traumatized, or so drained of conscious energy, that defense is no longer possible. Since
the conscious mind is unable to perform its protective role, the victim is often unable to
remove oneself from the abuse or trauma relationship. While this is an extreme example
of how trauma may function, a less extreme example would be perhaps a teenager who
was bitten by a dog as a child. This individual may fear dogs and experience an
apprehensiveness around the sight or even mention of them. Unlike an abuse victim, this
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boy’s trauma has not completely exhausted his conscious energy. If he was only bitten by
one dog, then there will only be that one bind. However since that energy has not been
unbound, the boy will experience fear. That fear is the remembrance of the previous
failure as well as it is the stress of the bind. When he sees or imagines a dog, he
remembers the event that he has bound. When this happens, the remembrance of a bound
trauma, the minds natural reaction is to re-live the event so that it may be processed and
released. This way, the energy stuck in binding could return to its function as a protective
force. However if the conscious mind has not become stronger and acquired more energy
since the time of the trauma, it will not be able to unbind and process the event. Thus,
until he gains more strength and can heal the original trauma, he will be more vulnerable
to that type of trauma in the future, because it would be an attack on an already damaged
system. When one speaks of ways for the conscious mind to gain strength to heal and
release the trauma, one is really speaking about some sort of therapy or process in which
the individual learns and develops coping mechanisms. This is the type of psychoanalytic
therapy Freud provides and he attempts to provide the individuals with strong through
equipping them to heal their unconscious wounds through understanding their dreams.
Freud comments that in the cases where a trauma becomes bound, the conscious mind
may repress the experience into the content of a re-occurring dream. Here, Freud expertly
defends the pleasure principle. He posits that in his analysis of dreams according to the
pleasure principle, that the dream is a wish fulfillment. In certain cases of trauma, Freud
admits that certain dreams are not wish-fulfillment dreams, and yet do not invalidate the
pleasure principle:
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…One may assume that they thereby subserve another purpose, which
must be fulfilled before the pleasure-principle can begin its sway. These
dreams are attempts at restoring control of the stimuli by developing
apprehension, the pretermission of which caused the traumatic neurosis.
They thus afford us an insight into a function of the psychic apparatus,
which without contradicting the pleasure-principle is nevertheless
independent of it, and appears to be of earlier origin than the aim of
attaining pleasure and avoiding ‘pain’. (11)
Freud actually takes a, “moment to concede for the first time an exception to the principle
that the dream is a wish-fulfilment,” before he explains the mechanism behind this type
of dreaming. He describes these types of dreams as obedience to a “repetitioncompulsion” which is fueled by the “(not unconscious) wish to conjure up again what has
been forgotten and repressed,” (12). A criticism to be made of Freud’s analysis is that
despite how articulately his argument was made, it seems possible that since he had
already written in agreement of the pleasure principle, he may have been biased due to
pride to find an exception and not a contradiction to the pleasure principal. Yet, despite
this potential bias, logic of the argument is worth its value. And one should keep in mind
that at the beginning of this essay, Freud openly admits that, “What follows now is
speculation, speculation often far-fetched, which each will according to his particular
attitude acknowledge or neglect.” But speculation is valuable in the way in which one can
apply those possibilities to a current reality. Through scrutiny of this contradiction
between the drives in life and death, as well as the different perspectives upon the matter,
one gains a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the fetish. When one discuss
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the ways in which people are deadening the world around the in order to feel alive, one
can understand that many of these fears that motivate people towards the necrophilic
nature of fetishism stem from failed attempts to properly respond to trauma.
When one considers this speculation upon the nature of the conscious and
unconscious minds in relation to fetishism, one can realize that in a way, the conscious
mind and sensory organs are but a fetish of the unconscious mind and vital organs. As
one recalls from Kaplan, “in it’s larger, more encompassing meaning, fetishism is about
the deadening and dehumanization of otherwise alive and therefore threateningly
dangerous, unpredictable desires,” (7).
(Kaplan 7). In this scenario, the unpredictable and threateningly dangerous desire is the
desire for life itself. It is the desire to engage in the act of living, which as Jung points out
is an endeavor one already know will end in death, as one are reminded by the demise of
our ancestors. This is why the vulnerable vital organs and susceptible unconscious mind
must create the dead layer of the conscious mind and sensory organs, which creates for
people a skin of death that flakes off as they walk. The unconscious mind protects life
with death. In order to ensure that the conscious mind will not interfere, the unconscious
mind deadens it, and creates separation upon creation, leaving only the door of dreams
open for communication and interaction. And of course it also allows through that which
it deems pleasurable as well as the pains that it cannot guard against. Clearly this
deadening conscious layer that the unconscious creates is not entirely effective, as one
have demonstrated that there are ways to connect with the unconscious. There are
methods such as psychoanalysis, introspection, meditation, and other types of therapy
under which one can bring make the content of the unconscious into consciousness.
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However when one is talking about the development of the human brain, one must
remember that humans did not always have the language and technology that they do
today. So in earlier times, this deadening of the outer layer was certainly more effective.
Now, as one continues to evolve, it would seem perhaps that the conscious mind has
become evolved enough to realize it cannot protect against trauma, and thus must either
re-connect with the unconscious to heal and strengthen and release bound energy, or to
create another form of protection. The latter option, the option of creating another from of
protection, is key to the concept of social media fetishism.
If the conscious mind is a protective layer that the unconscious mind attempted to
create as a dead layer to protect itself, then social media avatars are a third layer of
protection that the unconscious mind has created for itself. This third layer of the social
media profile will seek to achieve the same protective goals of the conscious mind. In the
social media profile, similar to the conscious mind, people will attempt to optimize
pleasure and minimize pain. This is most visible within the largest international social
media affliction center of this age: Facebook.
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Chapter IV
In order to classify Facebook, as well as other social media, as the most modern
form of the societal fetish, one must establish that the social media site meets the three
basic fetish qualifications of absence, substitution, and fixation.
In the example of sexual fetishism, absence was marked by a loss of intimacy.
With this new perspective of the conscious and unconscious mind, one can now begin to
better understand what is meant when one refers to intimacy. One realizes that the
unconscious mind lies at the core of the human psyche. The unconscious mind is the
puppet master, pulling the strings of the conscious mind and sensory organs. The
unconscious mind controls not only breathing and function of the vital organs, but also
dreams, emotions, and memories. When one speaks of intimacy, one is speaking of
access to the unconscious mind. The most common context for the use of the word
intimacy is in the case of sexual intercourse. In the case of sexual intercourse, one is
typically naked. One’s clothes are the outermost layer of one’s person. One’s clothes
form a layer. They are a protective layer for one’s skin. The unconscious seeks to protect
itself in two ways, both physically and psychologically. The physical layer of protection
for the unconscious is the skin, physical body, and sensory organs. The psychological
layer of protection for the unconscious is the conscious mind. These concepts of physical
and psychological protection have their differences, but at the same time, they cannot be
separated. The unconscious mind s inextricably tied to the vital organs. They are both the
same entity. So when one refer to the unconscious mind or vital organs, one is really
referring to both, but for the sake of describing both aspects of this mind and body
dualism, when one refers to the unconscious mind, one is referring to the psychological
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component and when one refers to the vital organs, one is referring to the physical
component. When the unconscious performs an action, it is both mind and body that
engages, however it is the unconscious that is responsible for the thought, and thus is
credited for the action. Understanding this, one can see clothes as an extra physical layer
for the vital organs in the same way that one can view a social media profile as an extra
psychological layer for the unconscious mind. The way in which the unconscious mind
and vital organs protect themselves seem to be through layers, and as one analyze, one
can see that these layers are numerous and varied. At the physical layer, one continues to
add more protection the more danger one perceives. So in other words, the colder the
weather becomes, the more layers one put on including coats, jackets, gloves, sweaters,
etc. When it is warm out, there is less of a temperature threat and so one feels more
comfortable with fewer layers. Or at least one does on a physical level. Americans are
aware that the onset of summer causes millions to panic about their physical appearance
as they begin diets and workout routines. The physical and psychological aspects of
protection are intertwined. In the winter, one may think that one is only protecting
ourselves against the cold, but one is also protecting oneself psychologically from
judgment and criticism. Of course there are those individuals who flaunt their bodies,
feeling that their perfect form needs no protection but this thesis does not focus on them.
This thesis is focusing specifically upon those behaviors that align with fetishistic
principles. And so although many of people may not be at the level of a full on foot
fetish, many people do engage in some behaviors, such as the desire to cover up or to
improve appearance for the summer, that are consistent with the logic and principles of
fetishism. When one realize the self-conscious body response that is brought about by the
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coming of beach weather, and that clothes are a protective layer against not only the
elements but also against criticism, then it is no surprise that nudity is typically a
characteristic of intimacy. In a way, intimacy is nudity. Intimacy is an unprotectedness.
But it is more than just the physical body being unprotected by a layer of clothing.
Intimacy is the removal of both psychological and physical layers and barriers. Intimacy
is the point at which the unconscious allows itself to interact with the outside world
without the mediation and protection of the conscious mind. If the conscious mind is a
barrier to the unconscious mind, then absolute intimacy would be pure unconscious
expression and interaction. However absolute intimacy, or absolute anything really, is too
abstract to describe with a concrete example, and perhaps there isn’t one. But one can
understand intimacy not as the binary difference between protection and no protection,
but one can see intimacy as the amount of protection a person has against the outside
world. I would imagine that at a certain level of protection removal, perhaps becoming
naked, or perhaps speaking to an individual about sensitive topics such as childhood
memories, traumatic events, or deep passions, one can say that a person has engaged in
intimacy. Intimacy is a personal experience and the level will vary for different
individuals. A person can be physically intimate while emotionally distant and vice versa.
However one can say that in a general sense, there is a level such as being fully clothed
and closed off to conversation that is clearly not a level of intimacy. Intimacy begins with
the decision to let one’s guard down either physically, psychologically, or both, and from
there, once a person has started to let her guard down; it is only a matter of how much of
the conscious layers of protection that one is able to remove until perhaps he or she has
reached a state of absolute intimacy. Seeing intimacy in this way, one can acknowledge
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that in the use of a Facebook profile, one is experiencing an absence of intimacy. A
Facebook profile provides an individual with both the ultimate physical and
psychological control. It is an almost impenetrable shield. This nearly flawless shield
against the outside world is a clear sign that intimacy has been lost. There a large fear and
protection motivation present in the creation and maintenance of a profile. The barrier of
the profile allows the individual the ability to protect against all threats.
The second characteristic of the social media fetish is the substitution of the actual
life lived in the real world that may be more dangerous for a virtual life that is safer and
more stable. The person substitutes for the absence of intimacy by instituting greater
mechanisms of control through the social media profile. For example, when creating a
Facebook page, the individual is the one that is in control of what pictures one posts and
allow oneself to be tagged in. This protection is almost perfect because other people have
the ability to tag an individual in pictures that one may not want to be seen in, or be
tagged in publicly. So for a brief period, there is potential danger. However as soon as a
person realizes that one is tagged, one can immediately untag oneself. In terms of one’s
profile pictures though, one is in absolute control. On Facebook, each user selects one
photo to represent oneself to the world and online community. Each time a user selects a
new profile picture, the previous profile picture is added to an album titled Profile
Pictures. This way, people can trace back to see all of the moments one has selected to
represent oneself over time. Recall the fear of judgment a person might have at the beach
in the summer time. With the ability to only choose those pictures that one believes are
the most attractive and acceptable for the world, the danger of criticism is reduced to the
threat of a negative comment on the picture. And even this is not much of a threat. Just
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like being tagged in a picture that one does not like, if a person comments negatively on a
picture that one does like, one also has the ability to delete that comment. Plus, a person
typically receives a notification that goes directly to a mobile smart phone that the person
likely carries at all times, so one will immediately be able to rectify and delete a negative
comment. Or also, if the person is swayed by the negative comment, one has the option to
delete the picture entirely from the album. But, it is unlikely that too many negative
comments will penetrate a person’s Facebook. Because before a person even has the
ability to comment on one’s Facebook, you must accept that person as your friend. So the
only people that have access to one’s pictures, statuses, and other content are those to
whom you have given permission. And even if one does accidentally accept the friend
request of a hidden enemy, there are the options of unfriending that person as well as
blocking that person. If one unfriends a person, that person may still be able to message
one and see some of one’s content. When one blocks a person, they are completely shut
out of one’s Facebook life. This is almost similar to the binding of trauma. A person can
be blocked as a way to remove that person from one’s life and thoughts, however that
persons name will always be present on a list of blocked accounts, thus creating a
blocking bind. Of course, there are some individuals who are not paying much attention
to the security settings of their pages. Some are reckless with their Facebook profiles just
as some live reckless lives. In fact, those who live reckless lives often post them
recklessly to Facebook and this can become a problem for employment. A boss does not
want to hire a person when the first image to appear when his name is googled is him half
naked in an inflatable pool filled with green Jell-O as his friends hold his feet in the air so
he can do a keg stand while simultaneously taking a hit of a joint. One cannot say that
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these type of people are definitely not Facebook fetishists, just because they are not
exhibiting caution. In some cases, they may be fetishists afflicted with stupidity. They
may be careless or not realize the dangers. In fact, it seems quite logical that a person
posting these types of pictures to the Internet is not considering them a potential danger,
for whatever reason. But it is the fact that these individuals are continuously posting
pictures of themselves and maintaining these profiles that is indeed a behavior that falls
in line with fetishism.
It is the continued maintenance marked by hours of use per week that qualifies
Facebook under the third characteristic of the fetish, which is fixation. Most people do
not just use Facebook sometimes. The feature that individuals typically spend the most
time absorbed in is their News Feed. The News Feed is a compilation of the activity of
your Facebook friends. This is different than notifications in that while notifications are
alerts about events that are specifically related to the individual using the account. The
notifications present themselves in the form of a little red blip at the top of the page
containing the number of notifications you have missed while you were away. People
often experience a feeling of excitement when seeing this blip because it means
something related to them has happened and become discouraged when they do not see it,
as it means that they are not in the spotlight. The News Feed is information about anyone
one is friends with as well as posts from any pages that you have liked. One can read
conversations that other people have had on their walls. One can see pictures that have
been posted as well as the comments. One can subscribe to pages that fill one’s Feed with
funny pictures, inspirational quotes, cat memes, hard news, entertainment, and just about
anything else one can think of. While using the News Feed, if the user sees a status that
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one does not want to see, one can hide that status from his Feed. Although the status has
not been deleted for others to see, it has been eliminated from the stream of information
of the primary user. This is a tremendous amount of control. When one is in the real
world, one often cannot control the information that is coming one’s way. When one is in
school, one is forced to learn what one is taught. When one is in social environments, if
one hears a conversation one does not want to hear, one does have the option of walking
away, but if one does not walk away then one can only attempt to tune it out, but will still
probably still pick up words here and there. With the News Feed, the user does not have
to move at all. The user does not have to change a single aspect of what one is already
doing. The only task required is the click of a button that says hide and the unwanted
sight is completely gone from the perception of the user. In some situations, the user
might want to completely hide all content from a certain friend. In this scenario, the user
may not want to delete one’s friend because one does not want to hurt one’s friend’s
feelings. One does not want his friend to see that he has been deleted. But one simply just
can’t stand seeing another of his friend’s posts about how well Lebron James plays
basketball. So without hurting one’s friend’s feelings and without creating any real world
conflict, one can hide all of the person’s content from his Feed.
Recently, Facebook has adapted an interface called the Facebook Timeline. Now,
Facebook has literally become a virtually timeline of a person’s life. If one enters one’s
birthday into the website, then one’s timeline begins with one’s birth date accompanied
by a generic unisex icon image of a blue baby in a diaper. If one enters the location of
one’s birth, the site provides a G.P.S. mapping image of the location. With this Timeline
feature, a person has complete control of the story that they are telling about themselves
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form birth to death. When one talks about the unconscious becoming injured by wounds
that the conscious mind cannot protect it from, one is talking about injuries to one’s
psychological concept of oneself. In one’s mind, one also has a timeline. This timeline of
one’s life, being that it is stored within one’s memories, is controlled and managed by the
unconscious. Similarly to the Facebook Timeline, one does not have a full account of
one’s life. One does not have a complete perspective. In fact, one forgets many more days
than one remembers. Out of 365 days in a year, most people have explicit memories of
less than 100 and maybe even less than 50 days. So in the same way that with one’s
Facebook profile one is consciously selecting the story one wants to tell and what one
wants people to see, the unconscious mind is deciding what it wants to remember, what it
wants to allow one to be conscious of sometimes, and the ways in which one’s past
memories affect one’s present behavior in ways of which one is not conscious. Your
unconscious mind and the way that it records one’s psychological timeline also does not
include the perspectives and thoughts of the people around one, as well as concepts that
one may not have fully understood at younger ages. For example imagine a five-year-old
girl having what to her is a traumatic experience where her mother will not buy her
chocolate at the supermarket. The girl may remember this event as a time when her
mother betrayed her or acted against her. If the event causes enough emotion, while the
girl may consciously forget this event, she may hold an unconscious grudge against her
mother, and might not be as generous with her throughout the rest of her life. This is the
way one’s unconscious mind works, affecting one’s current behavior based on previous
experiences that one may not even remember. But if one were to know more of the story
and see that the mother truly wanted to buy her daughter the chocolate but could not

Lepkowsky 81
because she was already struggling to buy basic groceries, then one would realize that the
little girls perspective is skewed. And certainly, if the little girl were to find this out when
she were older, she might as well realize that her mother was doing her best. However
one is not often reminded of the events of one’s childhood. One is not often aware of the
motivations behind one’s behavior and their potential associations to one’s past. The
decisions that one makes subconsciously under traumatic circumstances, especially
during the early formative years of childhood, are great influencing factors upon one’s
behavior and characteristics later in life. It is possible that even if when the little girl grew
up her mother did tell her of the event, and even if she did indeed forgive her and
understand, that her behavior towards her mother still may not change because of how
deeply rooted the binding of the traumatic event may be. A conscious forgiving of the
event may not be powerful enough to undo the intense psychic binding of a trauma.
When one looks at a Facebook Timeline, one must realize that to an extent, one’s
Facebook Timelines is a reflection of one’s internal personal unconscious timelines.
One’s Facebook Timelines is the pieces of one’s unconscious timeline that are safe
enough for the public to see, thus becoming a conscious timeline. They are the pieces that
one grasps and understand. But neither of these timelines are objective timelines of a
person’s life. Both the unconscious timeline and the Facebook Timeline are selectively
constructed. They must both pick and choose what to leave out. Since both are selectively
constructed, they can be challenged. They are insecure and unstable. They are so highly
subjective that any outside influence can potentially alter one’s internal experience. For
example, a man can believe that he is handsome, but if his conscious mind and will are
not strong, he may change his own perception of himself due to a comment from a
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woman who told him that he was ugly, or possibly even just rejected him. That is why
one is not fully aware of one’s own unconscious timeline. The unconscious identifies that
timeline with itself. As far as the unconscious knows, it is the collection of its
experiences. If those experiences are challenged, the unconscious may question its very
being, it may question itself and its perception of reality to the point of shock. A person
may collapse psychologically, becoming depressed, if his unconscious perception of both
himself and of life as a whole has been shaken. Knowing this, one can see how the
creation of a timeline that one is entirely in control of and entirely aware of would be
advantageous to the protection of one’s unconscious.
The unconscious wants to be in control of who and what it is. The way that this
translates to Facebook is that people use Facebook to start cataloging all of their
memories. People begin to take pictures of what they are eating and post them to
Facebook. They take pictures of themselves at concerts, sporting events, and shows.
People take pictures of themselves when hey are at parties, in the house, with friends,
alone, at a store, trying on clothes, flexing in the mirror, etc. In just about any situation,
there is probably a group of people who are taking pictures to upload to Facebook,
Instagram, or Twitter’s Twit Pic. But what’s strange about this event is that these people
are taking these pictures and uploading to qualify that they are at the event and are
experiencing, and yet in the act of uploading, they are missing the event. As people set up
their dinner for a photo shoot, it is getting cold, and thus may not even taste as good as it
looks. Facebook actually has an adaptation for their mobile application that allows a user
to “Check-In” to a location. What this means is that when a person is out in the world at a
bar, school, restaurant, salon, baseball game, supermarket, etc., one has the ability to use
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a G.P.S. feature that proves to the other people that a person was indeed where he said he
was. However in order to use this feature, it is a similar problem with taking pictures, in
that one must spend time typing in his location. One must also make sure that one is in an
area that is receiving service or wi-fi so that one can send the picture out to the Internet.
The major absence of Facebook is intimacy; however there are other absences involved
with Facebook as well, such as this absence from real life. It is a tradeoff. People trade
their living moments for dead representations of them. One cannot attain these dead
representations of one’s life without trading actual living moments. The phone does not
automatically update when a person reaches his location. Nor does the device take
pictures for itself as the individual enjoys the experience. In order to post an affirmation
of absence and life on the Internet, one must absolutely and necessarily transmute living
and intangible moments into dead and tangible representations. These memories, or
pictures that represent memories, become fetishized collections, similar to the hoarded
and dead items of commodity fetishism. One is once again presented with the shift from
being to having and from having in to appearing. The pictures are more tangible than
memories, and yet they are still not as tangible as the objects of the commodity fetish. Of
course, with these online pictures, there is the option to print them out into pictures that
can actually be touched and held and passed around, however most people don’t even do
this. Typically these pictures that people take are for the sole purpose of posting to
Facebook for the sole purpose of being seen by the people that they are friends with and
are linked with. This is a clear mark of the transition from having to appearing of which
Baudrillard speaks. In the past, the goal of this type of cataloging life fetish might have
manifested itself in the form of a physical photo album. This way one could have the
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photo album to remember the events one has tried to capture. With the photo album, there
is also not so much emphasis on the people that are going to see it. Of course with a
photo album, one ends up showing people and looking at them with one’s friends
sometimes. However they are not always available and they are not constantly updating.
When one takes pictures for a photo album, one does not know for a guarantee that the
photo will be seen. Before there were digital cameras, there wasn’t even that guarantee
that the picture would develop. With these complications to the earlier picture taking of
photo albums, there is necessarily less focus on the appearance of the pictures and who
will see them as much as it is a personal scrap booking to be shared with close family and
friends that will actually enter the house. That is another factor. Even when a photo
album is displayed, it is not typically displayed to complete strangers as a photo album
usually resides in a person’s home and relative strangers and acquaintances typically do
not enter our homes. So when one are thinking of how one will appear in the pictures,
one is not taking into account the critique of those who are on the outer fringes of one’s
social circles, and thus might have different judgment and criticism criteria than closer
friends and relatives. So with this new expanded audience of the Facebook and other
social media forms that allow users to post their pictures to the hundreds or maybe
thousands of people that they have accepted friend requests from. This clear shift from
the emphasis on having to appearing is a major criteria that gives assurance that social
media is actually an evolved form of the fetish.
Debord talked about the ideas of the marketplace and of the mainstream media.
Baudrillard talked about the idea of simulated reality and the societal shift from having to
appearing. In Facebook, there is a combination of both Debord’s separation through the
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mainstream media and marketplace as well as Baudrillard’s simulated reality of
appearances. In regards to the marketplace and mainstream media, Facebook brings the
marketing and advertising directly to you and even caters to you. When users log in to
Facebook and create their profiles, they, “like” what they find interesting, and approve of.
The “like” button is a button in the forms of a thumbs up that can be pressed to signify
what a person does and does not like, as well as to increase the amount of information
from that source that appears in the user’s News Feed. Simultaneously, Facebook is
sending this information about the bands, television shows, products, etc., that you are
“liking” to advertisers who pay for this information. Information that one put out there on
the Internet is being exchanged to advertising companies for profit. Of course this is a
concern on the level of privacy, but it also makes it so that every single advertisement
one sees on Facebook is geared directly towards oneself. Although the majority of
Facebook is targeted towards the appearing fetishistic characteristic of Facebook, there is
also the component of this advertising focused on the having characteristic. Although
society is shifting from having to appearing, people have not yet overcome having, and so
this component is still a part of Facebook. Also, even as society moves into the focus on
appearances, there are people who will move faster and slower. Facebook caters to all
fetishistic audiences. It caters to those who are just beginning their transition and are
heavily focused on having as well as those who are further along in the transition and pay
more attention to the pictures they post and the way that their profile looks instead of on
the items that they have.
This type of marketing also intensifies the separation caused by the spectacle. In the
example of the spectacle, one saw the mall as a type of modern day marketplace. In the
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mall, people can at least actually see and interact with each other. Though they may be
separated by their different focuses and by the stores in which they are shopping in and
the levels of their income, there is still a place where all of these individuals must
intersect. Facebook is only the appearance of where individuals intersect. Although all of
its user can say they are a part of Facebook, with all of the ways that Facebook can be
customized, it is impossible that two people will have the same Facebook. There may be
some similarities between people’s Facebooks, especially among groups of friends, and
so they are guaranteed to see many of the same posts, comments, and other shared
content. Of course they can, this is the audience one performs for. But in terms of the
pages that one are “liking” and the content that appears on our Feed from these “liked”
pages, one are having entirely different experiences of this world. Also, since one is
being marketed to directly, the products one sees will be different from those who have
different interests. This is only part of the separation. The biggest factor of marketplace
separation that is caused by Facebook is the ability to not only be advertised to online,
but also to use Facebook as a virtual marketplace. This way, one is not even actually
leaving one’s house. One does not even have to get dressed. One is able to order products
naked from our room, and just wait for them to get to our houses. If one clicks a product
link on Facebook, it will usually take one to a page where one is directly presented with
the option to buy the product. Depending on the website, this purchase may even be
immediate. Sites such as Amazon.com provide users with the option to set up shipping
and billing information at a given time so that at all points in the future, users can use one
click to complete an entire purchase without wasting time entering the same information
every single time. One notices a separation even with an actual marketplace, but with a
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virtual one, one is confirming Debord’s position that, “The spectacle is not a collection of
images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images,” (4). When one
purchases products in a virtual marketplace, one becomes a mediated image. One is not
acting in person whatsoever, but rather purely mediating through not only an image, but
also a cornucopia of images, all of which one have personally pre-selected. If one is
merely mediated by images, then one can certainly say that there is a large absence, that
being the absence of one’s entire person and body. Even when one uses Facebook to talk
to others, one is devoid of all body language communication as well as one’s tone.
According to a 2006 article from the New York Times, “Albert Mehrabian, a pioneer
researcher of body language in the 1950's, found that the total impact of a message is
about 7 percent verbal (words only) and 38 percent vocal (including tone of voice,
inflection, and other sounds) and 55 percent nonverbal,” (Pease, and Pease). Talk about
absence. When one is communicating through Facebook, one are reducing our
communication to that of only words, which one can see is just 7 percent of content,
while the other 93 percent of the intended communication is lost entirely. This is
reminiscent of the zombie meme that one discussed earlier. One is being reduced to one’s
most basic components. If one uses these web sites for hours per day and a lot of what
one is doing is reading what people have said and what they have posted, then what one
is spending time doing is communicating. Of course one is so attracted the zombie meme
on an unconscious level. In the same way that zombies only use the most basic
components of their basic function, so does one become like these zombies when one’s
interpersonal communication loses over 90 percent of its informational content. When
one think of this 7 percent effective communication, one can imagine it being similar to

Lepkowsky 88
the basic moaning and groaning that retains the tones and body language, but loses the
actual words. So perhaps these zombies are actually a step above today’s social media
fetishist, in that they have only lost the 7 percent that is words where one have lost the 93
percent that forms the rest. Of course one is not actually a step beneath these zombies, as
one still retains cognitive function; but the point is that one are not much better than these
zombies. The zombies that people favor in mainstream media are really just slightly
exaggerated dramatizations of themselves that they project into the world. One can also
see how this loss of communication facilitates separation. Most people probably do not
even realize how much communication is being lost through a virtual interface. The
problem is worse with the more recent generations of students whoa re growing up with
this technology. For these younger users who have never learned how to interact without
the use of social media interfaces and texting on cell phones, one are seeing a breakdown
in communication skills in general. Journalist Sherry Turkle from the New York Times
wrote an article in April of 2012 in which she analyzed the effects of text based
communication as well as interviewing high school students. One of the comments
included that of, “A 16-year-old boy who relies on texting for almost everything [who]
says almost wistfully, “Someday, someday, but certainly not now, I’d like to learn how to
have a conversation,” (Turkle). While the remark may be somewhat tongue in cheek,
there is a frightening truth hidden within this joke. A recent study performed by Pew
Internet and American Life Project titled “Writing, Technology and Teens,”
demonstrated that, “All that instant messaging and texting teenagers do is creeping into
schoolwork. In fact, 64 percent of youngsters ages 12 to 17 have used emoticons, text
shortcuts and informal language in school assignments,” (Horrowitz). With this statistic,
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it becomes blatantly apparent that all of this text-based messaging which one engages in
both on one’s phone and in social media sites is actually affecting intelligence. For 64
percent of students, growing up with technology has altered both their perception and use
of grammar. If one can verify that students are translating their texting skills into essays,
then when one take a look back at the comment from the 16-year-old who wants to learn
to have a conversation and realize that perhaps he actually would have difficulty having a
face-to-face conversation. He may actually be so used to texting that he may not be able
to interpret non-verbal interpersonal cues and may have moderate to extreme difficulty
carrying out an unmediated conversation. Social media has replaced television as the
opiate of the masses. Not only is one seeing the zombie meme reflecting society’s current
zombie state, but just as zombies continue to affect more and more people until there are
no survivors, the next generation has been indoctrinated into this zombie culture to the
point where they do not even realize that their communication lacks 93 percent of the
content of a face to face interaction. People are so focused on the appearance of a
conversation that they are losing most of its content.
As one follows this narrative, one realizes that Facebook continually takes the
substance out of life at every turn. People are exchanging more and more of the content
of their real lives for virtual ones. People are submerging ever deeper into the world of
appearance and simulation. Each generation will grow up with exponentially more
technology than the last, and thus will be further entrenched within simulation than the
last. To quote Robert Kirkman, Author of The Walking Dead comic book series, “We're
surrounded by the DEAD. We're among them -- and when we finally give up we become
them! We're living on borrowed time here. Every minute of our life is a minute we steal
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from them! You see them out there. You KNOW that when we die -- we become them.
You think we hide behind walls to protect us from the walking dead? Don't you get it?
We ARE the walking dead! WE are the walking dead,” (Kirkman). It is not the zombies
on the show that are the walking dead, it is the zombies on their couches, glued to their
television and computer screens. The fetish has evolved. It is no longer a fetish but rather
a spreading epidemic that can only be described as the zombie syndrome.
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